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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Anyone connected in some way with agriculture has an interest in 
farmland values. The Iowa Land Value Survey (1981) makes front page 
headlines as soon as it is released. The value of farm real estate now 
accounts for nearly 75 percent of total farm asset values. This means 
that land prices weigh heavily on the health of the agricultural econ­
omy. When values are rising, established landowners benefit from capi­
tal gains and greater financing capabilities, but beginning farmers 
find the higher cost of land drives up mortgage payments and makes 
entry more difficult. Heady and Tweeten (1963) give several reasons 
why an understanding of the determinants behind farmground prices is 
crucial in making farm policy and explaining resource movements: 
(1) The effectiveness and incidence of a government program de­
signed to raise farm income levels will depend on how fast those bene­
fits are capitalized into land values. Quick capitalization benefits 
current landowners but creates barriers to entry and can effect optimal 
resource adjustment in mixed ways. 
(2) Greater land values may drive labor to search for nonfarm em­
ployment , and can divert land from more socially optimal uses. 
(3) Upward land price trends may be a major factor in granting 
farm real estate loans (and we have recently seen how this can have 
drastic effects on both borrowers and lenders if the trend stops or 
reverses) and, thus, accurate predictions are vital. 
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(4) Long-range public planning for recreational, industrial, and 
residential sites is dependent to some extent on land values. If tech­
nology were to prompt a secular decline in agricultural land values, 
the prices of land for alternative uses would be affected, as would the 
tax base from farmland. These are only a few of the reasons why the 
determinants of farm real estate values should be understood. 
Declining land prices were not much of a concern until only 
recently. Before these declines, the index of farm real estate values 
had been on a steady rise since about 1954. Yet, real net farm income, 
which had always been posited as the major determinant of farmland val­
ues, showed less overall growth, several declines, and greater varia­
bility than land prices over the same period. Before the early 1950s, 
there had been a much higher consistency in the two variables' move­
ments. The widening divergence between the two created concern, and 
research over whether the higher farmland prices could be supported by 
the farm income picture. 
Many different approaches have been used to try to explain the 
movement of land values. Some studies achieved quite good results for 
the time period up through the early 1970s. This success was obtained 
with both econometric and time-series approaches. Pope, Kramer, Green, 
and Gardner (1979) reviewed the current validity of many of the better-
known econometric land value studies and compared their results to 
those from simple time-series estimation. They found that the econo­
metric approaches gave poor forecasts beyond their sample period. This 
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prompted their conclusion, "...if one is concerned with both predictive 
ability and economic structure, it would seem on the basis of the 
empirical performance of earlier econometric models that new research 
is needed to explain recent movements of farmland prices." 
The purpose of this investigation is, in part, to help fulfill 
this need. Expectations of future price movements in the land market 
are certainly of great concern to participants in that market. These 
capital gains or losses can contribute significantly to the value of 
farmland. Predictions of this variable are then an important factor to 
include in any modeling attempt of farm real estate prices. The 
rational expectations hypothesis (REH), along with other expectations 
formations, can be applied to the farm real estate market in order to 
represent capital gain expectations. We then may test the validity of 
the REH in the land market while developing a predictive econometric 
model. 
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CHAPTER II: PREVIOUS FARMLAND VALUE STUDIES 
Many previous land value studies have concentrated on the factors 
that explain the variation in price that exists between two or more 
specific tracts of ground. This study places a value on the aggregate 
of all farmland and lets specific prices be adjusted through site—spe­
cific factors. So the studies reviewed here primarily will be predict­
ing average U.S. farm real estate values. 
One of the first econometric models developed for the farmland 
market was proposed by Heady and Tweeten (1963). They cite the 
decreasing correlation between land prices and net farm income as one 
reason for the study.The need for "...exploring the structural basis 
of land prices..." in order to understand resource adjustments and for 
making farm policy is also expressed. Determining the extent and rate 
of capitalization of income benefits into land values was a primary ob­
jective. 
Their specification of the land price function uses a hierarchial 
approach. This system was used in order to remove some of the spurious 
correlation problems associated with collinearities, and still preserve 
structural validity. They describe the system this way: "Each of the 
following subsections may be considered a hierarchy of one or more var­
iables. A variable from the higher echelon is selected before moving 
to the next lower echelon. When the inCercorrelations become high, 
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causing instability in the coefficients and large standard errors, no 
further variables are added." 
Heady and Tweeten group the variables into five hierarchies : 
1. Farm Size and Machinery — Designed to capture farm enlarge­
ment demand. Existing machinery in "excess" can be used to 
farm additional acres, thus allowing the farmer to pay a pre­
mium for more acres. Variables here are farm size. A, and the 
stock of machinery, SM. 
2. Income to Land — This class is simply the amount of income 
farmers subjectively impute to land, and not the residual re­
turn to land. The argument here is that farmers may impute 
little return to their own labor, but include this portion of 
income in the return to land. Whether this is true or not, 
and especially whether one can adequately measure it, is 
highly debatable. Proxies suggested are basically variations 
of farm income, Yi. 
3. Discount Rate — The opportunity cost of investing in land. 
Depending on the supply of capital, the effective discount 
rate may be represented by the short-term bank interest rate, 
rSj farm mortgage rate, rf, rate of return on common stock, r, 
or the return on internal investments, ri. 
4. Assets and Technology — Asset surpluses create pressure for 
higher land values. Better technology drives up the return to 
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land for early adopters in the short run, but may depress the 
return to land in the long run. Variables in this group in­
clude liquid assets, SL, the equity ratio, E, investment 
stocks, SB, total cropland acres, Ld, real estates total phys­
ical volume, SRE, and investments in technologically improved 
inputs, QFR. The authors suggest that the gradual influence 
of these variables on land prices might best be captured by a 
time trend, T. 
5. Miscellaneous Variables — Added to reflect other factors pos­
sibly influencing the market. Suggestions include inflation­
ary trends, PT; government programs, G; weather, W; forced 
farm sales, F; institutional credit arrangements, C; and the 
rate of migration from agriculture, M. 
Heady and Tweeten basically chose the "best" variable from each 
class to be included in the model. They estimated several single equa­
tions using ordinary least squares (OLS). A partial adjustment model 
was chosen, i.e., a one-year lagged land price variable was included 
because "land prices do not adjust to equilibrium in the short run be­
cause of caution and inertia of past decisions, transactions too few 
and scattered to register a full short-run impact and for other rea­
sons." Their formulation resulted in a recursive model, the endogenous 
price and quantity variables being solved interdependently, but not 
simultaneously in time. 
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Raw annual U.S. data were used with the monetary values being de­
flated by the Gross National Product implicit price deflator. With 
current farm real estate value (in real terms) being the dependent var­
iable, Heady and Tweeten found the "best" regression to include past 
year's gross farm income, Y^t-l» ^^t-l» At-i, T, and Pt-l* The for 
this regression was .937. They found, according to the adjusted co­
efficient on the time trend, that there should have been a long-run 
decline in land prices. The authors concluded that the previous price 
increases had been due primarily to farm consolidations and scale econ­
omies of the larger farms. Through the use of the stock adjustment 
model they concluded that it takes a full ten years to make 90 percent 
of the adjustment to changes in the independent variables. Obviously, 
they infer that price adjusts very slowly and, thus, is never at an 
equilibrium level (an assumption of the partial adjustment model). 
Tweeten and Martin (1966) formulated a five—equation recursive 
model to answer the question, "Are land prices too high?" Their con­
cern arose from the fact that land prices had doubled since 1950, while 
commodity prices had declined and net farm income had only remained 
stable. The authors propose eight hypotheses relating to factors 
underlying land prices and suggest proxy variables to capture each 
influence. 
8 
(1) Farm consolidation to achieve scale economies and a viable 
economic unit; farm numbers and machinery stocks. 
(2) Capitalized benefits from farm programs; land retired and 
net farm income. 
(3) Excess number of boys wanting to farm; partially reflected 
by the relative wage rate and machinery stocks. 
(4) Expected land value appreciation; weighted average of the 
past three years capital gains. 
(5) Population growth creating increased demand for food and liv­
ing space; nonfarm employment, net farm income. 
(6) Nonfarm land investors; employment, rate of return on non-
farm investment (common stocks). 
(7) Changing farm financial structure; farm mortgage interest 
rate, farm real estate debt to equity ratio, liquid farm 
assets, and the proportion of real estate debt held by var­
ious lenders. 
(8) Concentration of wealth among larger farms; time trend. 
Obviously, some of the proxy variables are more direct measures of the 
influences than others. 
The authors* model (Table 2.1) was designed to be "predictive but 
is intended also to have some structural validity." Here, as in the 
Heady and Tweeten model, the recursive system imposes the assumption 
that the decisions regarding the current land supply are made prior to 
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Table 2.1. The Tweeten and Martin recursive model 
Equations 
(Variables to the left of the semicolon are endogenous) 
(1) Land price = f (L^., , T^; Ft-1 ' ^t-1 ' ^t-1^ 
(2) Land-in-farias Lj. = f (C^ ; F^_i, Lrt' ' ^t-1^ 
(3) Cropland = f(; F^-l » ^rt ' '^2' 
(4) Farm numbers = f(; , C*gt-_i , Sj. , T2> A^-i) 
(5) Farm transfers T^ = f(; JX^_j , , T2> T^-i) 
Variables 
(Annual U.S. data for 1923-1963) 
A is the number of farms, in thousands. 
C is cropland used for crops, in million acres. 
C*g is capital gains on farm real estate, C*gt-i = .5C'gt-i + 
•33C'gt-2 + .17C'g^_2 where C'g is capital gain. 
E is employment, national nonfarm, in millions. 
F is net farm income, in billion dollars (gross farm income less pro­
duction expenses). 
JX is the ratio of average earnings per employed factory worker, Yjj, 
to the average income per farm worker, Y^, modified by the nonfarm 
employment rate, U; ^ 
^ (1 - 5U,.i). 
is land removed from production by government programs, in million 
acres. 
L is land in farms, in million acres. 
P is the price index of U.S. farm real estate (land and buildings) 
per acre (1957-1959 = 100) deflated by the wholesale price index 
(1957-1959 = 100). The average per acre value of real estate was 
$104 in the 1957-1959 period; hence one index point in P is equal 
to $1.04 (1957-1959 dollars). 
r is the rate of return on nonfarm investment : Standard and Poor's 
data on common stock dividend divided by market value of stock, in 
percent. 
S is the stock of machinery, beginning year, in million 1957-1959 
dollars. 
T is transfers of farm real estate per 1,000 farms. 
T2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 1942 to 1948 and to 0 else­
where . 
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knowledge of the current land price. Lagged price is included in the 
first equation once again to pick up the tendency for slow price 
adjustment. 
Estimation was performed by ordinary least squares, but recursive 
(two-stage) least squares was also used for some equations. Autore-
gressive least squares was applied to the equations where the Durbin-
Watson statistic indicated problems with correlated error terms. The 
authors were not able to arrive at one "best" estimation technique, so 
results were published for all three methods. The ordinary least 
squares estimation of the land price equation provided these values; 
Pt = 89.25 .037Lt .23T^— .002JAt + .58F% - 1.56r^_% + .77P^_j 
(1.892) (2.49) (1.1642) (3.04) (2.38) (7.09) 
= .95 Durbin-Watson = 1,53, 
where t-values with 35 degrees of freedom are in parentheses. Most of 
the variables are significant at the 10 percent level or better. The 
authors felt the correct signs were obtained. The adjustment coeffi­
cient, one minus the coefficient of Pt-1 (1 ~ .77 = .23), suggests that 
roughly one-fourth of the adjustment of land prices to the exogenous 
variables is made in one year. The adjustment coefficient grew mark­
edly in the autoregressive least squares estimation, suggesting simul­
taneity may, in fact, be present in the determination of land prices 
and quantities. 
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Tweeten and Martin, using reduced form coefficients to determine 
land price impacts of the individual independent variables, concluded 
that 54 percent of the increase in land values over their sample period 
(1950-1963), could be attributed to farm enlargement and consolidation. 
Nonfarm demand for agricultural land (as measured by nonfarm employ­
ment) contributed 20 percent of the total, and capital gains added 13 
percent. The other variables were of minor importance. 
Herdt and Cochrane (1966), in an article entitled "Farm Land 
Prices and Farm Technological Advance," explored the reasons behind the 
divergence between land values and income per acre. They contended 
that technological advances have contributed significantly to the rise 
in farmland prices. They suggested that an aggregate supply and demand 
model of agricultural land is needed, and they proceeded to construct 
one. 
Herdt and Cochrane begin by using the theory of the firm to ex­
plain how farmers will buy land on the expectation of rising income per 
acre while actual income per acre, on average, remains unchanged. This 
stems from technological advances which create scale economies for 
larger farms, creating expansion demand for farmland. The increased 
demand raises land prices, and the temporary increase in income is off­
set. The authors felt that technical advances getting bid into land 
values are one cause of stagnant farm income. 
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Next, the authors reviewed the market concepts that generate the 
supply and demand for farmland. Because there is very little evidence 
to support a completely inelastic supply schedule, this side of the 
market should be included in any investigation of the forces determin­
ing land prices. Studies before theirs had basically looked at only 
the demand side of the market. It is mentioned that the market may not 
be perfect, but by allowing for the imperfections (basically lags are 
used in their model), one may consider land prices to be jointly deter­
mined by supply and demand. 
Four major reasons bring land onto the market: death of owners, 
financial pressures, occupational mobility, and locational mobility of 
farmland owners. These reasons give an individual a generally inelas­
tic supply curve. That is, if the price offered is high enough, the 
farm is sold; if not, it will not be sold. But since land comes onto 
the market at different minimum prices, the aggregate supply curve has 
the usual upward slope, and should, therefore, be explicitly included 
in the analysis of land values. 
Herdt and Cochrane stated that the opportunity for nonfarm employ­
ment is probably a major farmland supply shifter. Younger farmers 
interested in leaving agriculture need to find employment elsewhere. 
The unemployment rate, U, was used to represent these opportunities. 
Personal circumstances or death of the owner may also cause a farm to 
be put up for sale. But, due to the regularity of these influences. 
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neither was included as a variable in the model. Land owned by nonfarm 
investors might be offered on the market if the rate of return to land 
fell relative to the rate of return on other long-term investments. 
The rate of return on long-term bonds, R, was used to capture shifts in 
supply due to this source. The authors also postulate land in farms, 
Lf, affects the supply of farmland entering the market, as may the num­
ber of farms, Nf. As the number of farms falls, less owners are re­
sponding to the forces influencing supply. As land in farms falls, 
less land is expected to come up for sale. Thus, a decline in either 
Lf or Nf is hypothesized to also decrease supply. These variables are 
used to capture the same influence, so only one is used in any individ­
ual supply relation. — 
Herdt and Cîochrane also formulated a demand-for-farmland equation. 
Land used for farming will be valued according to the assessment of fu­
ture prices and productivity of the land. These predictions will pro­
vide a maximum bid the buyer would offer. Below this price, the amount 
an individual buyer will demand is dependent on the rest of the re­
sources that he has or can obtain to make the land provide an income. 
High land prices, given a fixed stock of money, will decrease the other 
resources the land purchaser can afford, so he will buy less land. At 
lower land prices, he can purchase more complementary resources, thus, 
he will purchase more land. An individual farmland demand curve, 
therefore, has a negative slope. The aggregate demand schedule also 
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slopes downward due to the slopes of the individual curves and the dif­
ferent maximum prices buyers are willing to pay. 
The postulated variables for their demand equation include vari­
ables related to the expected income from land. The authors stated 
this is the most important factor influencing farmland demand. Since 
future income must be discounted to its present value, the interest 
rate on long—term bonds, R, is included in the demand relation. In­
creasing urban and other nonfarm uses of agricultural land has driven 
up prices of farmland near the urban fringe. As this fringe is ex­
pected to grow, this drives up prices farmers will pay for farmland 
now. Urban land. Lu, is included for this reason. The ratio of the 
index of prices received to prices paid, Pr/Pp, is added to reflect the 
relative profitability of farming. Changes in the general price level, 
G, move the demand curve because as G shifts, the dollar amount that 
land is worth also changes. Herdt and Cochrane discussed how techno­
logical advances usually decrease production costs and, given constant 
returns to scale, will create pressure to expand output and, thus, farm 
size. Government price supports have an important role here in that 
they keep prices up and lead to an increase in net income. The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) index of productivity, T, is included 
in demand to reflect these technological influences. 
To reflect the lagged response of land prices to some of the 
exogenous variables (slow price adjustment of land prices), a weighted 
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average of the past three years values for G, Pr/Pp, and T was used. 
Traditional pure competiton is then reflected in the system, with the 
land market being in simultaneous equilibrium with respect to both 
price (land value) and quantity (transfers of farms per thousand farms), 
the jointly dependent variables. For between census years where no 
data were available, the authors used straight line interpolation to 
create values. Letting Ns and Nd be the number of farms (per thousand 
farms) supplied and demanded, respectively, Herdt and Cochrane esti­
mated the system using two-stage least squares. The first estimation 
proved unsatisfactory (Table 2.2), as equations (1.1) and (1.2) had 
four of the ten coefficients being not of the expected sign. 
Table 2.2. Herdt and Cochrane estimation results 
(1.1) (N® dependent) P R u Lf 
expected sign + + — + 
estimated -0. 176 0. 264 -1. 197 0.068 
coefficient (0. 067) (2. 661) (0. 242) (0.032) 
(1.2) (P dependent) Nd R T Pr/Pp Lu G 
expected sign — — + + + + 
estimated -3. 512 7. 119 -1. 161 2.361 4-347 -3. 187 
coefficient (0. 770) (1. 796) (0. 549) (0.462) (0.839) (0. 195: 
(2.1) (N® dependent) P R U Nf 
expected sign + + — + 
estimated 0. 064 -5, 672 -0. 789 0.004 
coefficient (0. 119) (1. 224) (1. 188) (0.003) 
(2.2) (P dependent) N<i R T Pr/Pp G 
expected sign — — — + + 
estimated -1. 043 8. 315 1. 699 0.757 0.379 
coefficient (0. 697) (2. 191) (0. 321) (0.372) (0.158) 
^The standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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After examination of correlation coefficients, the authors con­
cluded that the problem lay in the .98 intercorrelation between urban 
land and productivity. Removal of urban land corrected some of the 
problems (see equations 2.1 and 2.2, Table 2.2), but an unexpected 
sign was still found for the interest rate variable. Herdt and 
Cochrane explained that the model might be misspecified or that R is 
the incorrect proxy for farm sector interest rates- But the variable 
is kept in the model when reduced form coefficients are estimated and 
simulations run. 
Reynolds (1966), and similarly Reynolds and Tinmons (1969), pre­
sented a two-equation recursive model of the U.S. farmland market. The 
latter, being a summary of the former, will be discussed here. Their 
major objective was to identify the principal factors affecting land 
values and estimate their effects. 
Reynolds and Timmons presented a useful discussion of the charac­
teristics of the land market. A purely competitive market has the fol­
lowing characteristics: (1) homogenous products; (2) many small-volume 
buyers and sellers; (3) free entry and exit: and for a perfectly com­
petitive market we add (4) perfect knowledge. Obviously, land is 
heterogenous, and often there are few buyers and sellers in the market. 
Unavailable credit can limit entry into the market. Thus, the farmland 
market does not meet the conditions of a purely competitive market. 
Because land sold must stay where it lays, the market is often lo­
calized. A prospective land buyer from one state would find it very 
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difficult to learn of and inspect all of the farms up for sale in 
another state. Brokers can help bring buyers and sellers together, but 
there are still many small local markets. Reynolds and Timmons hypoth­
esized that the current quantity of farmland on the market is a func­
tion solely of exogenous variables, independent of the current price of 
farmland. Hence, their use of a recursive system. 
The authors tried several alternative specifications of the model, 
but only the one they considered in detail will be presented here. The 
model is: 
V = Fi(T; NFI, GPL, CP, Cg, A, r) 
T = F2(Cg. ^/NF, La, D/E, A). 
The endogenous variables are farmland value per acre, V, which is used 
as a proxy for price, and the number of voluntary transfers of land per 
1,000 farms, T, used to represent quantity. 
The exogenous variables chosen for the system were each discussed 
by Reynolds and Timmons. Net farm income (NFI) is used as one explana­
tory variable in the farmland value equation. A capitalization rate, 
r, is also included to provide the discount factor present in the tra­
ditional land valuation formula. The authors stated that even though 
land values and farm income have not always moved in the same direc­
tion, they are still thought to be highly related. They cited several 
studies that have shown a connection between the two variables. 
Strohbehn (1966) found an increasing share of net farm income was being 
capitalized into land values from 1949 to 1959. Scofield (1965b) 
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discovered the residual return to farmland had also been increasing, 
averaging 40 percent of net farm income by 1965. Unfortunately, as 
Reynolds and Timmons did not acknowledge, this points to net farm in­
come being an even poorer proxy for the returns to farmland, as those 
returns are not even a constant percentage of net farm income. But 
Renshaw (1957) found that farmland values were significantly affected 
by gross farm income per harvested acre, and Scofield (1964), in a 
cross-sectional investigation, concluded that net farm income could ex­
plain 83 to 89 percent of the variation of farmland values across 
states. 
Reynolds and Timmons asserted that government program benefits get 
capitalized into land values. Programs such as tobacco allotments have 
been shown to affect farmland prices. Hedrick (1962) estimated the 
value of one tobacco acre allotment to be $1,139, part of which gets 
built into the value of that acre. The authors divided government pay­
ments tied to land, GP, into two groups for the estimation; average 
conservation payments, CP, and average land diversion payments, GPL. 
Technological advances are again included in this study. Reynolds 
and Timmons contended that with greater output due to the technical 
progress in agriculture, farm product prices would decline relative to 
other prices because the demand for farm products is inelastic. This 
output price decline causes gross farm income to fall. This in turn 
will pull down net farm income (unless costs fall by more than the 
prices), and this means that the return to all factors of production 
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will fall. As the return to land declines, expectedly so do land val­
ues. If price supports keep output prices from declining, a positive 
influence on land prices is expected by technological progress. Hours 
of labor per acre. La, is used to proxy this influence. Farm enlarge­
ment, A, is included to capture demand for additional land to spread 
out fixed costs and acquire some economies of size. It is measured by 
the increase in average farm size. Expected capital gains, Cg, are 
entered to reflect the anticipation that rising land prices today 
create the expectation that they will continue to climb. This gener­
ates increased demand for farmland, because of the higher predicted re­
turn and capital gains favorable tax position. They are calculated as 
a weighted average of past levels. 
Increasing population was discussed as an influence that raises 
land prices, creating more alternative needs for farmland. But popula­
tion density turns out insignificant in their final analysis. Other 
variables entered in the modeling as exogenous, but not discussed were 
the ratios of farm to nonfartn earnings, F/NF, and debt to equity, D/E. 
Time-series estimation, with Cg3 representing capital gains during 
1933-1941, and b representing the intercept for 1942-1947, provided 
these results (standard errors in parentheses): 
T = -11,23 + 31.67 b - 7.36 D/E + 13.76 La + 1.58 F/NF 
(34.74) (8.31) (1.04) (1.13) (.47) 
- 3.35 A + 4.86 Cg - 2.96 Cg3 ; = .984. 
(1.53) (1.52) (1.55) 
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And for the land price equation, with Vi = land + buildings value, 
V2 = only farmland's price, T* = predicted T from previous estima­
tion, and NFI2 = NFI for 1956-1955: 
Vi = 72.99 - .23 T* + 11.97 GPL + 7.55 CP + 2.37 Cg 
(9.44) (.04) (2.36) (2.86) (.63) 
-2.25 Cg3 + .38 A + .73 1/r + 2.02 NFI + .23 NFI2; r2 = .985, 
(.55) (.44) (.20) (.48) (.31) 
V2 = 41.87 - .16 T* + 13.93 GPL + 5.01 CP + 1.52 Cg 
(9.29) (.04) (2.32) (2.82) (.62) 
-1.57 Cg3 + .84 A + .73 1/r + 1.83 NFI + .25 NFI2; r2 = .982. 
(.54) (.44) (.20) (.48) (.30) 
The period of fit was 1933-1965. Most variables were statistically 
significant at least at the 10 percent level. Cross-section analysis 
was also performed by the authors, but will not be reviewed here. 
Klinefelter (1973) published an article concerned with determining 
the factors affecting Illinois farmland values. A single-equation 
model of land price was developed. Variables affecting land values 
were hypothesized to include: 
1. Inflation - nominal land values should rise with general price 
increases. 
2. Net rents - expected greater returns in the future generate 
higher land values today. 
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3. Government programs - restricted use of farmland coupled with 
price supports creates greater incomes that are capitalized into land 
prices. 
4. Technology - pressures land prices upward if prices are sup­
ported. 
5. Farm enlargement - increases demand for land to capture scale 
economies. 
6. Farmland transfers - reflects supply on the market, negative 
expected sign. 
7. Capital gains - land price increases create expectations that 
they will continue, also tax advantages of capital gains relative to 
ordinary income. 
The variables used to measure the factors are as follows : 
P = implicit GNP price deflator, 
NR = residual returns to landlords, 
GP = total government payments per acre, 
C = three-year moving average corn yield, 
A = average size of farms in acres, 
T = number of voluntary transfers of farmland, and 
ECg = farmland value today, minus farmland value last year gives 
capital gains, which are then included as a weighted average 
of past levels. 
The March 1 index of the value of farmland and buildings per acre pub­
lished by the USDA is used as the dependent variable, V. Deflating the 
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monetary variables, Klinefelter found that the exogenous variables ex­
plained 97.9 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. ECg 
and A were significant at the 1 percent level, GP at the 10 percent 
level, and NR and T insignificant. Only the sign on GP was unexpected, 
probably explained by the high intercorrelation between itself and A. 
When GP is dropped from the equation there are only slight coefficient 
value changes, no sign changes, and the remains high at .973. 
Pope et al. (1979) reviewed several of the past articles that have 
presented econometric models of the U.S. farmland market. They were 
concerned about the current predictive ability of the previous models. 
As stated earlier, they found that additional work was necessary to ex­
plain recent land price movements. 
The models of Reynolds and Timmons, Tweeten and Martin, Herdt and 
Cochrane, and Klinefelter were reestimated using additional years of 
data. The results were compared with the original parameter estimates. 
Forecasts were run with the "better" models, and compared with predic­
tions obtained from simple time-series approaches. 
Reestimation of the Reynolds and Timmons' model resulted in sev­
eral changes in the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients. In the 
price equation alone, four of nine signs were reversed. The same re­
sults were obtained when the Tweeten and Martin system was reestimated. 
The Herdt and Cochrane model performed more robustly with respect to 
the time change. Any sign changes occurred on variables that when re­
estimated were found to be statistically insignificant. The 
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Klinefelter model also performed rather well after the change, some 
signs were implausible but the remained high. But the extra data 
amounted to only two years in this case, much less than for the other 
models. 
Forecasts were made using the Herdt and Cochrane, and Klinefelter 
models. None of the Herdt and Cochrane reduced—form equations pre­
dicted well beyond the sample. The estimates were well under the ac­
tual land values. The Klinefelter model forecasted better than the 
Herdt and Cochrane, and often better than the time-series models. But 
all of the approaches left predictions generally below actual values. 
The additional data included data up through 1972, and one would expect 
new ideas would have to be incorporated in the modeling to capture the 
recent declines in farmland values. 
Harris and Nehring (1976) developed a bid-price model for agricul­
tural land. Maximum bid-prices were calculated for five (size) classes 
of farms. Net income per acre, its variability, tax, discount, and 
growth rates, net worth, and a measure of risk aversion were all used 
in a theoretical model to determine the offer price. They conclude the 
largest farms may not have the greatest bidding advantage. High mar­
ginal tax rates and surprisingly, diseconomies of size contribute to 
this disadvantage. Adams (1977) pointed out that if land is considered 
a nonperpetual investment, both the income stream and the discount rate 
must be adjusted for the individual's income tax rate. Bid-prices are 
more likely to represent present values than prices, and even at that. 
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as pointed out by Adams, "Bid—prices equal present values only if the 
investor is risk neutral or if acquisition of the asset does not change 
the riskiness of his portfolio holdings The riskiness of land hold­
ings relative to other assets has been examined using a capital asset 
pricing model. Barry (1980) found that farmland appeared to be less 
risky than the other assets he considered. 
Martin and Heady (1982) examined the impacts of inflationary ex­
pectations on farm real estate. They were basically interested in 
testing the hypothesis proposed by Feldstein (1980a, 1980b, 1980c) that 
expected inflation may increase the real value of assets such as land. 
Martin and Heady estimated several equations with the average value of 
farm real estate as the dependent variable. But the thrust of the 
equations was to test the Feldstein hypothesis and not predict land 
prices. Most of the equations had one or more lagged dependent vari­
ables present, and the estimation produced unexpected results for many 
of the other explanatory variables. Still the authors concluded that 
"from the evidence considered, it does not appear that inflationary ex­
pectations have had a major, direct impact on the value of U.S. farm 
real estate." 
Castle and Hoch (1982) developed formulas to separate out the var­
ious components that determine land prices. Their basic thesis is 
stated as: "We see the typical prospective investor in farm real es­
tate as forming an expectation of next year's price. Then, if expected 
price exceeds current price, he will want to buy real estate; if 
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current price exceeds expected price, he will want to sell, or at least 
not buy, real estate. If all prospective investors behave in this 
fashion, a market change will be set in motion, and next year's price 
will move toward the expected price." 
Thus, Castle and Hoch developed a system to explain the expected 
price of farm real estate per acre, in hopes that this will represent 
the actual price when realized. Prediction is not advised by the au­
thors because the long-run components of land values cannot be accu­
rately computed. Rather, the model is intended to analyze the disag­
gregated factors that were operating in the past. 
Real estate values in agriculture were found not to be explainable 
by capitalized net rents alone. Capitalized future rents plus capital 
gains also entered current land prices, as did price level changes, 
which Castle and Hoch include as a subcategory of the capital gains 
components. 
Shalit and Schmitz (1982) modeled the derived demand for farmland, 
and a pricing equation was estimated as part of their structural form. 
The article focused on farmland accumulation and the allocation of 
credit for such purchases. A life-cycle model using utility maximiza­
tion is used to model land accumulation. Utility is only derived from 
the land when it is passed on to heirs. Credit to purchase additional 
land is available from lenders, depending on the farmer's current asset 
and debt position, and the lender's expectations of the farmer's asset 
values in the future. The authors concluded that savings and 
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accumulated real estate debt are the main determinants of high farmland 
prices. Land prices are generated not only by the return to the ground 
itself, but by the additional debt it can support. The latter is 
highly dependent upon bankers' expectations of future real estate 
values. 
This chapter has reviewed some of the studies dealing with the 
market for agricultural land. It was not designed to be an exhaustive 
review. The next chapter will present the idea of "rational expecta­
tions," and review studies on that subject. 
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CHAPTER III. REVIEW OF THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) was first introduced by 
Muth (1961), in an article entitled, "Rational Expectations and the 
Theory of Price Movements." In order to explain actual expectations 
data, Muth suggested, "expectations, since they are informed predic­
tions of future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of 
the relevant economic theory." Such expectations are dubbed 
"rational." 
The REH implies that the expectations of firms tend to be distrib­
uted about the prediction of the theory. In other words, the underly­
ing s tructure of the model gives the framework by whichTatxonal expec­
tations of a dependent variable in the model are formed. Mathemati­
cally speaking, this means that rational expectations are equal to the 
mathematical expectations of the dependent variable (Y) conditioned 
upon all information (l) available at the time the forecast is made, 
i.e., 
Y| = E(Yt| It-l). 
The hypothesis asserts three things according to Muth, "(1) Information 
is scarce, and the economic system generally does not waste it. (2) 
The way expectations are formed depends specifically on the structure 
of the relevant system describing the economy. (3) A 'public pre­
diction, ' in the sense of Grunberg and Modigliani (1954), will have no 
substantial effect on the operation of the economic system (unless it 
is based on inside information) 
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Muth used a simple example to illustrate the hypothesis. Taking 
an isolated market with short-period price variations and a fixed 
production lag of a nonstorable commodity, let the market be 
represented by the equations: 
Dt - -bPt (Demand), 
St = •*" ^t (Supply) , 
Dj- = St (Market equilibrium), 
where D is consumption, 
S is production of units in one period as long as the production 
lag, 
P is the market price, 
P^ is the expected market price in period t, based upon informa­
tion available in period t-1, 
Ut is the random error term, unknown when production decisions 
are made, but known when the product is sold, and 
t is the time period. 
In this example, all of the variables are measured as deviations from 
equilibrium values. Solving for Pt yields 
Ft = - 8/b Pt - ^/b Uf 
If the errors are serially uncorrelated and have mean zero then 
EPt = - 8/b Pt' 
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where E is the expectations operator. Rationality implies that 
EPt = P® 
so that if S/b # -1, then P® = 0, and the realized price equals 
the expected equilibrium price. 
Muth also derived the rational expectation of price under several 
different assumptions. For example, if the disturbances are correlated 
and there is a supply shock to the system caused by technological 
change, predicted price is a geometrically weighted moving-average of 
past prices. The value of the REH is that it allows us to solve for 
the coefficients of adjustment from the estimated parameter values. 
Muth's examples were perhaps unfortunate, as they represent special 
cases where the rational expectations turn out to be purely extrapola-
tive. Later work has shown that the REH is applicable to many models, 
and its value becomes clearer in those instances. The basic idea of 
the REH is that forecasts of a variable are not a function of its past 
levels, but rather the predicted values of all the factors that deter­
mine the level of the endogenous variable in question. 
The REH differs from other theories of expectation formation in that it 
requires much more information to be gained and processed by agents in 
the market. It requires that there is a known structural model that 
represents the forces affecting a dependent variable. Anticipations of 
those exogenous variables must also be given. In contrast to the REH 
are three basic alternative mechanisms to represent how expectations 
are formulated. 
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Naive or static expectations can be given as; 
Pf+l = Pt. 
or simply stated as; expectations of next period's value for a variable 
call it P, are simply the currently observed value. Obviously this 
forecast requires very little information. 
Extrapolative expectations require a longer time-series for the 
variable in order to "extrapolate" out how the variable changes over 
time. Several various specifications fall under this classification; 
a. linear time-trend 
Pf+l = a+bt 
b. exponential growth curve 
- ae" 
c. autoregressive trend 
P|+l = a+bPf 
Adaptive expectations can be represented as; 
^t-Pt-l = g(Pt-l-Pt-l), 
and stated as the revision in our anticipation of Pt is proportional 
to the error we made in our forecast of ^t-l* can represent 
adaptive expectations as an infinite weighted-average of previous 
levels of the variable with the weights declining geometrically as the 
lag length increases; 
Pt ~ gft-l + g(l-g)Pc_2 + g(l-g)2Pt-3 + 
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The alternative expectation formation mechanisms to the REH all 
require at least one past observation of the variable in question. But 
in no case do they require information outside of the variable in 
question. They may in fact be valid when information is scarce or very 
costly (this study assumes that all information is available at no 
cost), or when the agents choose for whatever reason to follow such a 
process. 
The REH, however, provides a more theoretically appealing base to 
expectations formation. Because agents use the structure of the under­
lying economic model when making forecasts, a change in the structure 
will cause a revision of the forecasts. This will not occur under the 
other anticipatory mechanisms. 
After Muth's initial article, the REH was markedly absent from the 
literature for several years. Then analytical techniques were devel­
oped that could handle the estimation of such models. Two general 
classes of studies followed; one set being applications of the theory 
and the other set being articles testing the restrictions implied by 
the theory, and estimation techniques for use with REH models . 
The application of the REH has been primarily to macroeconom.ic mo­
dels. Agricultural commodity supply has also been investigated using 
this theory. Because no studies have included the REH in analyzing the 
farmland market, or in the way intended in this study, the previous ap­
plications will only be briefly mentioned. McCallum (1976b) used the 
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REH to examine the natural rate hypothesis. Turnovsky (1970), and la­
ter Fisher and Tanner (1978), examined price expectations and whether 
or not they were rational. Turnovsky concluded extrapolative expecta­
tions fit businessmen's price expectations best while the later paper 
found farmers' price expectations to be most closely approximated by a 
weighted average of past prices. Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982) found 
that Muth's hypothesis did characterize well supplier behavior in the 
broiler industry. Maddock and Carter (1982) discussed the REH, its im­
portance in macroeconomics and aggregate supply, and also its criti­
cisms, testing, and give an excellent example of its mathematical con­
sequences in models. Baillie, Lippens, and McMahon (1983) have tested 
the validity of the REH when applied to the foreign exchange market. 
Once again doubt was cast upon the validity of the REH. McCallum 
(1980), Sargent (1973, 1976a, 1976b), and Sargent and Wallace (1975, 
1976) are just a few of the authors who have included Muth's concept in 
macroeconomic applications. 
Wallis (1980) published an article entitled, "Econometric Implica­
tions of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis." Fisher (1982) used a 
similar framework to analyze the effects of the REH on agricultural 
forecasts and policy. The implication of the REH in a simultaneous 
equation system was presented by Wallis in a manner similar to the fol­
lowing. Let 
(1) Ay^ + By® + Cx^^ + 0x2% ~ ^ t 
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where is a vector of g endogenous variables at time t, 
y^ is a vector of g expectations formed at time t-1 of the en­
dogenous variables in period t, 
xit is a ki vector of exogenous variables at time t, and 
X2t is a vector of k - k]^ intercept and seasonal terms whose fu­
ture values are known at time t. 
The four parameter matrices A, B, C, and D have dimensions (g x g), 
(g X g), (g x kl), and (g x [k-kj]), respectively. Wallis found a nec­
essary condition for identification of this system is that the expec­
tations are less in number than the exogenous variables. The author 
treats several different cases, but only that of no lagged endogenous 
— variables will be presented here.—Rational expectations imply 
(2) yS = E(yt| If-i), 
where It-l is information available in period t-1, the period the fore­
cast is made. Noting 
(3) Ayt + By^ = Ut - Cxit " 0x2%, 
then taking conditional expectations yields 
(4) ECAyj. + By®) = E(Ut - Cxit ~ Dx2t)-
Therefore, 
(5) (A + B)y^ = - C^it - Dx2t, 
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where are predictions of the x^j- variables for period t, given all 
information obtainable through period t-1. Solving for y® gives 
(6) y® = - (A + B)~^ Cxit ~ (A + Dx2t-
Substituting (5) into (1) puts the model in terms of observable vari­
ables; 
(7) Ayt - B(A + B)-l Cxjt + Cxit - B(A + B)"! Dx2t + Dx2t = Uf 
The REH restrictions are embodied in equation (7). The reduced form o 
the system is: 
(8) yt = A-1B(A + B)-^ C^lt - À-1 Cxit + A-^B(A VDxgt 
- A-1 Dx2t + A-1 Uf 
Errors due to the REH are simply the difference between (8) and (6); 
(9) yt ~ y® ~ A~1 C(xit - xit) + A~1 U^. 
Thus, one can still make errors if rational, and the error will depend 
entirely on the unanticipated portion of the current exogenous vari­
ables and random disturbance. 
The final step is to specify the predictive function for the xij. 
variables. If a first-order vector autoregressive model for x^t is 
used such as 
(10) xit = + et. 
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and if the white noise errors, e^, are independent of , then 
E(xit ^ t-l) - Hxjt-l so that xjt = The set of equations that 
need to be estimated are then (7) and (10). Wallis touched on some of 
the techniques that can be used to estimate these equations. He also 
proved that E(yt~yt^^ is smaller for the EEH case than for any other 
forecast mechanisms. 
Notice that the REH causes within-equation and cross-equation pa­
rameter restrictions to be imposed on the structural equations. These 
restrictions can provide a formal test of the validity of the hypothe­
sis. If they can be expressed mathematically, a Wald-type test can ex­
amine the validity of the restrictions. Unfortunately, even in many 
simple models the restrictions become very complicated because they in­
clude nonlinear parameter restrictions. In this case, a likelihood 
ratio test can be performed on the restricted versus the unrestricted 
model. Hoffman and Schmidt (1978) and Revankar (1980) have both worked 
with ways to test the REH restrictions. 
Hansen and Sargent (1980) also developed a convenient method to 
estimate dynamic linear rational expectations models. They derive de­
cision rules for the economic agent having rational expectations. The 
idea of 'Granger causality' is discussed as pertaining to the inclusion 
of variables in the decision rules. The restrictions implied by the 
hypothesis are examined, as are estimation strategies. Unfortunately, 
this article deals only with linear models, and many REH models 
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turn out to be nonlinear in one form or another. Chavas and Johnson 
(1981) examined the effect the REH has upon econometric models. Their 
approach is more akin to that of Wallis than Hansen and Sargent . 
Fair and Taylor (1983) published an article entitled "Solution and 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Dynamic Nonlinear Rational Expectations 
Models." The authors mention that their method is the only one they 
know of that will provide maximum likelihood estimates for nonlinear 
rational expectations models. Their technique uses full—information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation to solve for the structural param­
eters of the system. These estimates can then be used in a "solution 
method" to obtain forecasts of the endogenous variables. The REH and 
the structure of the model place restrictions on the model which affect 
these forecasts. 
Solution of the system proceeds as follows: first represent the 
system as 
^i(Ytj Y{-_2 , . . . jY^—p J Ej;_]^Yt+,. . •, E^—lYt+ii,Xt jC£) = 
where i = l,...,n, 
Y^ = an n-dimensional vector of endogenous variables at time t, 
E^-i = the conditional expectations operator based upon the model 
and information available at time t-1, 
X(- = the vector of exogenous variables at time t, 
C£ = the vector of structural parameters, and 
= the scalar random error teras. 
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The errors are assumed stationary, having mean zero, and may be corre­
lated across equations and over time. The model is nonlinear if the 
function is nonlinear in the variables, parameters, or expecta­
tions. It is a rational expectations model in that anticipations of 
future endogenous variables are conditional forecasts based on the 
model itself. The system is dynamic, since lags and future predictions 
of the endogenous variables are present. 
The first step is to calculate FIML estimates of the Ci parame­
ters. FIML is desirable here because it includes all a priori informa­
tion in the estimation, i.e., it imposes all of the REH restrictions 
during estimation. Let be the n by n Jacobian matrix whose ij 
element is âfi/ôyjt (i,j=lj.• • ,n). Also, let S be the m by m 
matrix whose ij element is (1/T) ^^it^^jt (i jj = l> • • • jm) 
where m is the number of equations (let them be the first m equations) 
in the model that are stochastic (m being less than or equal to n). 
Finally let C be the vector of all the unknown coefficients in the 
model. Assuming the uif- are NID, FIML estimates of C are 
calculated by maximizing 
with respect to C. The covariance matrix of these estimates (say V) 
can be estimated by 
T 
L = -T/2 log |S j + 2 log 
t=l 
V = -(Ô2L/3CÔC')-1 
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where the derivatives are calculated at the optimum. This procedure 
can be modified slightly if the uij- are correlated to still give 
FIML estimates. 
It is clear that in the calculation of these FIML estimates for C, 
we need to solve the model once first to get the u^t which are part of 
S. This is done using the "solution method" eluded to earlier. 
Dubbed the extended path (EP) method, it is used to generate 
^s-lYs» • ••s^s-iys+h (s=l,...,T) for a given initial guess at C. These 
conditional forecasts are used along with the y and x data to compute 
values of u£s and thus S. Then everything is ready for the determina­
tion of L and thus the FIML estimates of C. 
The EP method for solving nonlinear rational expectations models 
proceeds as follows. We want to solve for the level of the endogenous 
variables in period s, given a set of the parameters. This example 
will assume no serial correlation between the error terms, but that 
problem can be dealt with. This numerical method entails a series of 
iterations that converge from an initial guess of the levels of the en­
dogenous variables in the future, to a path of rational expectations 
for these variables, consistent with the predictions of the model it­
self. 
Label the initial set of expectations for the endogenous variables 
Eg-iys+r> as g^, r=0,l,.... Only a finite number of these forecasts 
need to be formulated in practice. Also each forecast is bounded, that 
is, gj. is less than M for every r, where M is not a function of r and 
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is finite. 
Fair and Taylor (1983) described their EP method as a series of 
five steps: 
"(i) Choose an integer k, which is an initial guess at the number 
of periods beyond the horizon h for which expectations need to be com­
puted in order to obtain a solution within a prescribed tolerance level 
d. Set Eg-iy^+r equal to g^, r=0,1,...,k+2h. For the purpose of de­
scribing iterations, call these initial values er(l,k), r=0,l,...,k+2h; 
the values at later iterations will then be called efCi.k), i greater 
than one. 
(ii) Obtain a new set of values for Eg-iys+r» r=0,1,...,k+h, by 
solving the model dynamically for ys+r> r=0,l,...,k+h. This is done by 
setting the disturbances to their expected values (usually zero), using 
the values Eg_iXg,...,Eg_iXg+h+k in place of the actual x*s, and using 
the values 6^(1,k) in place of Eg-iyg+f. Call these new guesses 
ej.(i+l,k), r=0,1, ... ,k+h. If the model is nonlinear, then the solution 
for each period requires a series of Gauss-Seidel iterations. Call 
each of these a Type I iteration. 
(iii) Compute for each expectation variable and each period the 
absolute value of the difference between the new guess and the previous 
guess, i.e., compute the absolute value of the difference between each 
element of the ej.(i+l,k) vector and the corresponding element of the 
ej.(i,k) vector for r=0,1, ... ,h+k. If any of these differences are not 
less than a prescribed tolerance level (i.e., if convergence has not 
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been achieved), increase i by 1 and return to step (ii). If conver­
gence has been achieved, go to step (iv). Call this iteration (per­
forming steps (ii) and (iii) ) a type II iteration. Let ej.(k) be the 
vector of the convergent values of a series of Type II iterations 
(r=0,l,...,k+h). 
(iv) Repeat steps (i) through (iii), replacing k by k+1. Compute 
the absolute value of the difference between each element of the 
ej.(k+l) vector and the corresponding element of the er(k) vector, 
r=0,l,...,h. If any of these differences are not less than d, increase 
k by 1 and repeat steps (i) through (iv). If convergence has been 
achieved, go to step (v). Call this iteration (performing steps (i) 
through (iv)) a Type III iteration. Let e^ be the vector of the con­
vergent values of a series of Type III iterations (r=0,1,...,h). 
(v) Use e^ for Eg-j^yg+j-, r=0,l,...,h, and the actual values of 
to solve the model for period s. This gives the desired solution, say 
yg, and concludes the solution method." 
Basically, their method iterates on future paths of the antici­
pated endogenous variables. Starting from an initial guess at the 
path, the path is extended beyond period k+2h until further extensions 
do not effect the solution by more than the prescribed tolerance level 
and are convergent. 
This estimation procedure has the advantages of giving FIML esti­
mates of the models parameters, being able to handle linear and nonlin­
ear models, autocorrelated errors, multiple viewpoint dates, and dif-
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ferent assumptions about the expectations of the exogenous variables-
The main disadvantage of their method is the cost. To obtain FIML 
estimates the computer routine iterates successively until various con­
vergence criterion are met. Even with relatively relaxed convergence 
limits, this turns out to be extremely expensive. 
The SEH does have a theoretically appealing basis to it. A major 
freeze in Florida during December would be expected to influence peo­
ple's expectations of orange prices in May. Heady and Kaldor (1954) 
found this to be true. Farmers price forecasts were found not to be 
derived from simple projections or trends, but from a more complex pro­
cedure. The authors felt expected prices were determined first by 
looking at current prices, and then if sufficient information was 
available, adjusting current prices for the expected effects of impor­
tant supply and demand forces. This process would agree with rational 
expectations in the Muth sense. 
But the REH is not without its criticisms. The idea that each 
economic agent in the market forms expectations whose conditional sub­
jective distribution of outcomes equals the conditional objective dis­
tribution of outcomes has been questioned by Frydman (1982). Using the 
Lucas (1975) interpretation of the REH "that available information is 
optimally utilized (by every agent) in forming expectations," Frydman 
went through some elaborate mathematical proofs to examine the theory. 
He concluded, based upon his assumptions, that the potential for con­
vergence to a rational expectations equilibrium seems to be remote in 
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most cases. In addition, social norms that do not get included in the 
available information set play a major role in market behavior. 
Sheffrin (1983) discussed some of the other ^  priori criticisms of 
the REH. He found that in most cases, arguments can be given both in 
favor and against the REH on specific points. There is no doubt the 
assertion that agents base their expectations on the true probabilities 
governing the system is a strong one. How do the agents learn these 
probabilities? Why should actual expectations be represented as condi­
tional expectations? A person must really just see the hypothesis as 
one in a series of theories about expectation formations. It would 
seem that on average, agents' expectations would be distributed about 
the true probabilities governing the market. Agents' actions drive the 
market and as we are trying to describe market behavior, it is the 
agents' probabilities that should matter to us. On average, would not 
those probabilities be the true probabilities? 
No doubt the discussions over the pure theoretical validity of the 
REH will continue for some time. The inconclusive evidence on the REH 
as applied to specific situations adds arguments for both sides. Cer­
tainly, the hypothesis is deserving of more tests. Next, we proceed to 
develop the methodology by which the REH may be examined as it relates 
to the market for agricultural land. 
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CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY 
The farm real estate market is a market with unique characteris­
tics. The good is nonmovable, nonhomogeneous. The total amount of 
land is fixed in quantity, but it is mobile within uses. Even though 
farmland exists nationwide, the market most often works through very 
localized channels and only a relatively small percentage of land 
changes hands each year. Therefore, most buyers and sellers do not 
have perfect information about the system. Obviously, these traits 
point to a market that does not fall into the pure or perfect competi­
tion category, as we so often think of for agricultural commodities. 
But the other classes of capitalistic market systems(monopoly, oligo­
poly, and monopolistic competition) do not adequately describe the land 
market either. Thus, the farm real estate market is a system operating 
under its own unique set of rules. 
Over the years, there have been two major thrusts in land price 
studies. One type sought to explain why one tract of ground differs in 
value from another relatively similar tract of ground. Characteristics 
such as soil type, slope, and distances from schools, etc. have been 
the source of price variation in these micro-oriented studies . The 
other type has centered upon the value of all agricultural land as a 
whole. Given its specific and generally unvarying characteristics, why 
does its price vary over time? This macro—level approach is the empha­
sis of the present undertaking. 
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Given the unique characteristics of the U.S. farm real estate mar­
ket, the question is how best to model it? This study will examine the 
farmland market using a simultaneous supply and demand model. The REH 
will be introduced in order to represent market participants' capital 
gains expectations. Why should the REH play a part in the determina­
tion of land prices? Previous econometric studies and market surveys 
have shown that capital gains, which is a major factor in the rate of 
return to land (which in part generates the lands value), are an impor­
tant force to consider. However, capital gains are simply price appre­
ciation of the owned real estate. Thus, one way to represent expected 
capital gains is to include an anticipation of the future price of the 
asset. The REH gives a theoretically appealing way to formulate this 
expectation. It uses the structure of the model that determines farm­
land values, to formulate the predicted future price of agricultural 
land. Previous work has usually represented capital gains only as some 
weighted average of their past levels. 
Thus, predictive econometric modeling of the farmland market also 
allows us to empirically test the REH as it applies to this market. 
One would think that this is a very good application in which to test 
the REH. First of all, capital gains anticipations are generally be­
lieved to be and have been shown to be important forces operating in 
the land market. But Herdt and Cochrane (1966) neglected to include 
this variable in their demand and supply model. It seems reasonable to 
assert that there is some set of structural equations that can describe 
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the operation of the farm real estate market. The determination of 
this structural form is a large portion of this research. The REH then 
asserts that participants use expectations of the independent variables 
in that system to derive anticipated land prices. Given that many, if 
not all, of the exogenous variables to be presented are readily observ­
able, this case would appear to be a good test of the REH. 
A two-equation simultaneous system will be used to represent the 
interaction of supply and demand in the farm real estate market. Some 
previous land price studies have used partial adjustment models, argu­
ing that with so few transactions, land prices don't adjust very rap­
idly to shifts in the explanatory variables. The presence of frus­
trated sellers (or buyers), they feel, indicates a market that does not 
clear. In those instances, it may well be that the seller (or buyer) 
is just not willing to adjust the price enough for a sale given the 
current market conditions. It would seem that on the average, 
aggregate annual land value statistics should represent very near the 
equilibrium price. It would also seem that each new transaction would 
also reflect the most current market conditions and would then 
represent the new equilibrium situation. Thus, a simultaneous demand 
and supply model seems appropriate. The correctness of this system can 
be checked by the significance of the jointly dependent right-hand side 
variables. The proposed system in standard matrix notation can be 
represented as 
h 
= APt + .2^ BjpG+j + cXt + Ut; (Demand), 
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Qt = DPt + FjPt+j + GYt + Zt; (Supply), 
Q? = Q? (Market Clearing), 
where = quantity demanded of farmland. 
= quantity supplied of farmland. 
P = price of farmland. 
pe 
= expected prices of farmland up to time t + j where j 
runs from zero (or one) to the finite planning 
(expectations) horizon h. expectations being 
formed at time t-1. 
X and Y = vectors of the independent variables (including inter­
cepts) , and 
— U and Z = random error terms. 
Price and quantity are jointly dependent variables. The REH will pro­
vide the framework for obtaining values of the unobservable price an­
ticipations . 
Specification of the exogenous variables to include in the system 
is rather difficult. Often the same factor influences both relations. 
The independent variables can act in concert or alone, and some could 
pose collinearity problems. Many times the influence of a factor is 
felt through several channels. Net farm income, for example, while 
probably not a good measure of the return to land, can affect a farm­
er's willingness to stay in agriculture and his ability to obtain 
credit. Therefore, the addition of net farm income as an explanatory 
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variable will in part depend on how accurately the forces net farm 
income exerts upon the land market have already been represented. 
When attempting to model the market for farmland, one must first 
consider the good in question. Farmland, while providing some utility 
directly (through investment potential, living sites, recreational pos­
sibilities, etc.), is primarily thought of as a factor of production in 
producing agricultural commodities. The demand for agricultural land 
can then be considered a derived demand. That is, derived out of its 
usefulness in producing the final commodities that directly satisfy 
consumer wants. According to Kamerschen and Valentine (1977), "The de­
rived nature of factor demands implies that the strength of the demand 
for any factor will depend upon: (1) the marginal physical productiv­
ity of the factor; and (2) the market price of the commodity it is pro­
ducing ...." So the revenue generating capacity embodied in farmland 
is one of the main factors to include in modeling the farm real estate 
market. 
One must also consider the fact that farmland is a factor of pro­
duction when modeling the supply side of the market. Factor supply 
curves are typically found to be upward sloping like conventional sup­
ply curves, but their elasticities are affected by additional forces. 
Land is not locationally mobile, but it is mobile within particular 
uses. Farmland may shift to nonagricultural uses if developments be­
come more profitable, yet the total quantity of land has not changed. 
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Developed land is more immobile than bare ground because of the conver­
sion costs necessary to change its use. 
While this study will not attempt an explicit examination of the 
microeconomic foundations of the demand and supply curves for agricul­
tural land, the basic ideas underlying factor demand and supply sched­
ules will serve as one important guideline in specifying the model. 
Past land value studies can give another indication of what exoge­
nous variables to use in the modeling. As part of the Iowa Land Value 
Survey (1981) information is collected on the most important factors 
operating in the farmland market during the past year. Therefore, that 
study can point out some variables that should be included. Economic 
theories of demand, investment, etc. can also guide the selection of 
appropriate variables. Finally, personal judgment from my own observa­
tions of the farm real estate market will lead to some variables for 
the model. This study will concentrate on farm land values. That is, 
the bare ground portion (including improvements such as tile) of farm 
real estate, excluding buildings and farm household acreage. Knowing 
this, farm real estate in the following discussions should be regarded 
as only the farmland portion. Forces influencing the demand and/or 
supply of farm buildings are not included in this investigation for 
this reason. 
According to the theory of demand, price and quantity are in­
versely related. The simultaneous system proposed is based on the 
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contention that prevailing prices do in fact play a part in the amount 
of land brought on the market. 
Previous studies have often found expected capital gains to be an 
important factor working on land values. Prospective buyers have in 
the past, considered an investment in land a good hedge against infla­
tion. Farmland prices appeared to move up at no less than the rate of 
general price inflation. Capital gains are a noncurrent return, and 
do not become realized (except for their impact on credit potential) 
until the asset is sold, but they are a return nonetheless. Investment 
theory would dictate that funds flow to where they can earn the highest 
returns. Increased capital gains in farmland would then tend to draw 
greater investment demand (from farmers and/or nonfarmers) for agricul­
tural land. Some landowners may sell their holdings if the rate of 
capital gains were to get too low. 
Along the same lines, the rate of return to famnland would seem to 
be a concern to persons on both sides of the land market. Whether 
buying land to farm or as an investment, the purchaser is interested in 
making money. Landowners must also derive some income from the farm-
ground in order to continue to hold on to it. The return to land is 
that part of farm income that can be attributed to the farmland. Some 
of this will be in the form of a current cash return, and some of it 
will come in the form of capital gains. Farmers express their concern 
over this return when they complain about low farm product prices. 
Past models have typically reflected this factor with net farm income. 
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But net farm income has returns to labor, capital, and management also 
embodied in it. Melichar (1979) argued that it is incorrect to compare 
net farm income with land prices. He stated, "an aggregate return is 
being compared with a unit price; moreover, the aggregate income is 
being regarded as a return to real estate alone ignoring other produc­
tive assets." Thus, ideally the percent return to land should be used 
to measure this effect on the real estate market. The income return to 
land should also be separated out when capital gains are included 
separately. 
The idea of opportunity cost would also seem to be an influential 
force on both the demand and supply sides of the farmland market. When 
treasury-bill rates and the return to other alternative assets grew 
sharply relative to the rate of return to farmland, respondents to the 
Iowa Land Value Survey showed a great deal of concern over this matter. 
Farmers and investors, alike, could not justify purchasing additional 
land, and some land was even sold off in order to get capital invested 
in other higher paying and less risky assets. 
Due to the almost universal need for credit when buying farmland, 
it would seem logical to reflect financial conditions in the demand 
equation. The question is what variables to use to reflect this demand 
pressure. Certainly, the rate of interest charged on farm real estate 
loans, either alone or multiplied by the price of the ground, reflects 
the cost of financing. Farmers debt-to-equity ratio gives one indica­
tion of their existing debt capacity. Net farm income and farmers off-
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farm incomes affect their credit potential also, but the level of these 
incomes may change when the demand for land does not. 
Doll et al. (1983) after reviewing many articles concerning farm 
real estate, found that most studies included a variable to capture 
technological progress and enlargement demand. They state "technology 
has created a new source of demand for land: enlargement demand for 
expansion of existing farms." Heady and Tweeten (1963) gave an example 
where a farmer can with his existing machinery, farm an extra 40 acres 
of ground. By spreading out his fixed costs, that farmer can pay a 
premium for the extra land. Herdt and Cochrane (1966) discussed the 
effects of technical change upon the marginal products of agricultural 
production. Only in the event that technological progress is not 
neutral will marginal products and thus factor shares be altered. 
Therefore, land prices may or may not change when technical progress is 
evident. One must be careful in interpreting variables included to 
measure the desire for farm expansion. Greater family support, 
prestige, and the one chance in a lifetime to buy the neighboring 80 
acres also influence the desire to expand the farm, along with the 
scale economies reason. 
Land values have been hypothesized to increase due to the capital­
ization of the benefits from farm programs. As long as farm income is 
supported by the government, reducing risk to the farmer, land values 
get these positive influences built into them. This raises the rate of 
capital gains in farm real estate. 
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Taxation in its various forms can also affect the demand for agri­
cultural land. The favorable tax position on capital gains relative to 
current income, adds value to land that provides a high proportion of 
its return in the form of capital gains. The progressivity of income 
taxes can also lead to differential bidding power between different 
sized farms. But in an aggregate model such as the one proposed here, 
these tax effects are either very difficult or impossible to deal with 
or they are averaged out in the aggregation. 
Increasing population creates the demand for more space for urban 
development and other alternative uses of farmland. More land avail­
able for rent, represents the willingness and profitability farmers 
find in renting. Thus, investment demand may rise due to the opportu­
nity to rent out the farmland. General price inflation expectations 
might cause the demand for farmland to rise if, as stated earlier, land 
is considered a good hedge against inflation. 
The Herdt and Cochrane article (1966) is the only well known study 
that has attempted to derive an explicit land supply equation. This 
seems to point to the difficulty in modeling farmland supply, but also 
suggests the need for additional work in this area. The inclusion of 
capital gains expectations through the REH is one step in the direction 
of an improved supply relation. 
Retiring farmers and deaths of landowners obviously puts farms up 
for sale. Herdt and Cochrane left measures of these factors out of 
their system because they felt their occurrences were fairly regular. 
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Farmers selling but not retiring will look for jobs elsewhere and thus 
the opportunity for off-farm work can influence the supply of land com­
ing to the market. Herdt and Cochrane argued that supply shifts with a 
change in the amount of land in farms or the number of farms. As land 
in farms falls, less land is going to come up for sale. A change in 
the number of farms (and thus farm owners), since it changes the number 
of people responding to the forces affecting supply, can shift the sup­
ply function. 
If more children are wanting to return to the farm, it will induce 
their fathers to hold on to the family farm rather than sell it. Fore­
closures surely increase the amount of farmland up for sale. These 
factors along with the ones mentioned above will be examined for their 
importance in describing the farm real estate market. For a descrip­
tion of the variables used in the estimation, the data sources, and 
what they were used to proxy, see the Appendix. 
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CHAPTER V. ESTIMATION AND SOLUTION RESULTS 
Aggregate, annual data were used to estimate the parameters of 
the model. All monetary variables were deflated using the Consumer 
Price Index (1967=100). Collinearity was a problem with several of the 
variables, possibly the result of the significant trends present in the 
data. Therefore, the data were detrended and the residuals used to 
perform all calculations. This also reduced the possibility of spuri­
ous correlation. 
The first step in the estimation process was to determine the form 
of the structural equations describing the operation of the land mar­
ket. The assertion of a simultaneous demand and supply model meant the 
derivation of only two equations was necessary. Capital gains expecta­
tions were left out to be entered once the other variables were deter­
mined. No attempts were made to examine if additional exogenous vari­
ables might become important as capital gains were entered. Based upon 
the previous chapter, two-stage least squares (2SLS) in SAS (1982) was 
used to estimate the structural equations. The following system was 
determined to be the best representation of the farmland market (Table 
5.1) . 
Several interesting results should be noted. First, notice that 
the detrended real income return to land (DRIRLA) does not appear in 
the demand equation. When tried, its sign was as hypothesized but the 
t-ratio was very low (.23), as was the parameter estimate (.26). This 
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Table 5.1. 2SLS estimation of model without capital gains 
MODEL : DEMAND S SE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
DEP VAR: PRICE/ACRE 
(DRPAC) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION 
VARIABLE® 
384.627329 
25 
15.385093 
539.501889 
2.4931 
-0.2619 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
136.35 
0.0001 
0.9745 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
STANDARD 
ERROR T RATIO 
QUANTITY OF TRANSFERS (FIRST.DQSAL) -0.25 0.13 -1.84 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ) -836.67 60.00 -13.94 
INTEREST RATE (DFLBR) -9.82 1.50 -6.53 
OFF-FARM INCOME (DRPPFN) 0.09 0.01 6.47 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE (DAVS) 1.11 0.14 7.74 
PERCENT RENTED LAND (DLDRTD) 20.12 2.27 8.86 
U.S. POPULATION (DUSPOP) 3.79 0,96 3.94 
MODEL: 
DEP VAR: 
SUPPLY S SE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
QUANTITY 
(DQSAL) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = 
VARIABLE* 
3721.877 
26 
143.149099 
2252.889 
1.2265 
0.3622 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
6 . 2 2  
0.0004 
0.5895 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
STANDARD 
ERROR T RATIO 
PRICE/ACRE 
FORECLOSURES 
RETURN TO LAND 
DEBT/EQUITY 
STOCK YIELD 
FARM INCOME 
(FIRST.DRPAC) 
(DNFCL) 
(DRIRLA) 
(DDBTEQ) 
(DPSTKY) 
(DRPFFF) 
1 . 0 0  
5.94 
14.01 
666.49 
22.28 
—0.06 
0.30 
2.09 
4.38 
292.65 
8.41 
0.03 
3.25 
2.84 
3.19 
2.27 
2.64 
-2.03 
^Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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result is not consistent with Melichar's (1979) finding that a great 
deal of the rise in land prices could be explained by growth in the 
real income to land. The current result does not seem unreasonable in 
the sense that when using the traditional land valuation formula: 
, annual income return 
value = —? 
discount factor 
with only net cash income per acre in the numerator, the discount fac­
tor would have to be 3 or 4 percent to allow the value to be anywhere 
near current market prices. Thus, the income return to land cannot 
alone explain current prices unless land others really only demand a 
four percent return (ignoring capital gains). Therefore, the income 
return may be overshadowed in importance by other factors, resulting in 
the statistical insignificance found in the present study. Government 
payments were also found to be an insignificant factor in the demand 
and supply equations. 
Note that the slope of the demand curve, the coefficient on the 
number of transfers (DQSAL), is negative and significant at the 10 
percent level. In supply the slope, the coefficient on price/acre 
(DRPAC), is positive and highly significant. Thus, we can say that 
current prices do affect the current quantity of land on the market and 
vice versa. This lends credence to the argument for a simultaneous 
demand and supply system of the farm real estate market. 
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All of Che exogenous variables in both relations are of the cor­
rect a priori sign (except the return to land (DRIRLA)), and signifi­
cant at or very near the 5 percent level. Demand strengthens with a 
fall in the debt-to-equity ratio of farmers, a drop in the Federal Land 
Bank interest rate, a rise in the per-capita income of farmers from 
non-farm sources, an increase in the average size of farms, an increase 
in the percent of land rented, and growth in the U.S. population. Sup­
ply of land offered for sale increases with the number of farm foreclo­
sures, the debt/ equity ratio of farmers, the yield on preferred stock, 
and falls as the per-capita income of farmers from farming rises. 
The only puzzling result is the sign of DRIRLA in supply. The 
positive sign suggests that as the income return to land goes up, more 
land is offered for sale. Why don't landowners hold onto the land if 
it is providing a greater current return? The reason for this result 
might be found if we look at the current situation in the land market. 
The income return to farmland is down considerably. Some farms are for 
sale, many of these distress sales, but relatively few transactions are 
actually occurring. Not many people are wanting to buy when the income 
picture (which may translate into the expected capital gains picture) 
is so poor. As the income return picks up, which is a good selling 
point for the landowner, and more people are willing to buy farmland, 
we could very well see an increase in the number of farms offered for 
sale. Also, DRIRLA is highly correlated with DRPAC, which may also 
account for the positive coefficient. 
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The demand equation appears very well specified. The mean squared 
error (MSB), F ratio, and the R-square are all very acceptable. The 
supply equation also has good statistics for these measures, but not as 
good as those for demand. The Durbin-Watson d statistics are both in 
the inconclusive range. For demand, the statistic is greater than 
two, but not overly so. When subtracted from four, the statistic for 
demand is roughly 1.51, compared to the 5 percent significance critical 
values of dj = 1.061 and d* = 1.900. For supply the d statistic is 
less than two (1.226) but again between d^ = 1.127 and d* = 1.813. 
There are several ways to deal with d statistics that lie in the 
inconclusive range. The easiest way is to ignore the problem and say 
that there is a fair chance that no serial correlation exists. Least 
squares estimates will be unbiased even if inefficient, and thus are 
still useful for solution purposes. Obviously, this is not an entirely 
satisfactory way to deal with the problem. 
Another way is to examine the serial correlation of the exogenous 
variables in the system. It can be shown (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(1981)) 
Cov(et, e^-i) + r(B-B)2 VarCX^) 
d » 2-2 
Var(et) + (B+B)2 Var(Xt) 
where B = the slope parameter, 
e = the error term, and 
X = the exogenous variables. 
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Even though B is an unbiased estimator of B, there will be some sam­
pling errors involved in the estimation process. Therefore, B will not 
equal B and r, the serial correlation coefficient for the X's, comes 
into play. A high value of r pushes d towards zero. Thus, if the 
exogenous variables are highly positively serially correlated, the 
dj critical value is the appropriate one to apply. Even though 
the data have been detrended, they still exhibit some positive auto­
correlation. Then using d^ as the critical value we could accept 
the null hypothesis of no first-order serially correlated error terms. 
The last test for first-order autocorrelation explicitly entered a 
variable into the model to capture that tendency. Using SYSNLIN in SAS 
(1982), the model can be rewritten in such a manner that a parameter 
for serial correlation is estimated. A simple t-test then tests the 
significance of autocorrelation in the model. Doing this for both de­
mand and supply, neither of the coefficients were significant at the 5 
percent level. On the basis of the above tests, autocorrelation was 
determined not to be a significant problem. One should remember, how­
ever, that if autocorrelation had been corrected for, the parameter 
estimates and t-ratios would change. Some tests were run on the models 
presented here, and the changes were only minor. 
These equations were next taken into solution (simulated). Using 
SAS (1982) SIMLIN, the reduced form was computed, predicted values gen­
erated, and within-sample forecasts generated by statically simulating 
the model (See Figures 5.1-5.2). 
PLOT OF DRPACOYEAR 
PLOT OF DRPACHAT5YEAR 
LEGEND: A = 1 085, B = 2 OBS. ETC. 
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-25 + 
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Figure 5.1. Simulation of price in model without capital gains 
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Figure 5.2. Simulation of quantity in model without capital gains 
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Predicted prices track surprisingly well without any capital 
gains variable in the model. Root mean square error (RMSE) is 3.98 
while root mean square percent error (RMS%E) is 252.77 (See Table 5.9). 
Turning points are picked up regularly but several are missed. Sur­
prisingly, the model without price expectations predicts the down­
turn in land prices even before the drop occurs. 
Forecasted quantity also tracks fairly well. RMSE is 7.98 and 
RMS%E is 405.65. Predicted quantity often lags one period behind 
actual in picking up turning points. 
The next step in the estimation process was to enter capital 
gains expectations. Three different mechanisms were used to represent 
these anticipations: naive expectations, adaptive expectations, and 
rational expectations. Under naive expectations, lagged prices as pre­
determined variables represent the forecasted future land values. Two-
stage least squares estimation provided very satisfactory results. As 
expected, higher forecasted capital gains drive up demand and lower 
supply. The coefficient is highly significant in demand and signifi­
cant at better than the 10 percent level in supply (See Table 5.2). The 
signs and magnitudes of all other coefficients remain nearly the same 
except for some in the demand curve. The slope coefficient remains 
negative but loses its significance. Perhaps the reason for this lies 
in the addition of the capital gains variable. It may not matter what 
the current price of land is for a demander of land, if capital gains 
are expected there will still be a positive forecasted rate of return. 
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Table 5.2. 2SLS estimation of model with naive expectations 
MODEL : DEMAND S SE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
DEP VAR: PRICE/ACRE 
(DRPAC) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION 
VARIABLES 
240.846441 
24 
10.035268 
243,368782 
2.8443 
= -0.4301 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
186.60  
0.0001 
0.9842 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
STANDARD 
ERROR T RATIO 
QUANTITY OF TRANSFERS (FIRST.DQSAL) -0.09 0.14 -0,61 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ) -638.18 97.98 -6.51 
INTEREST RATE (DFLBR) -7.24 1.57 -4.60 
OFF-FARM INCOME (DRPPFN) 0.06 0.02 3,32 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE (DAVS) 1.03 0.10 9.57 
PERCENT RENTED LAND (DLDRTD) 10.22 3.67 2.78 
U.S. POPULATION (DUSPOP) 3.62 0.78 4.62 
CAPITAL GAINS (DLAGP) 0.38 0.14 2.71 
MODEL : SUPPLY SSE 3208.039 F RATIO 5.49 
DFE 25 APPROX PR>F 0. 0007 
DEP VAR: QUANTITY MSE 128.321541 R-SQUARE 0. 6058 
(DQSAL) OBJ 2669.133 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 1.2193 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = 0.3523 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
VARIABLE^ ESTIMATE ERROR T ] RATIO 
PRICE/ACRE 
FORECLOSURES 
RETURN TO LAND 
DEBT/EQUITY 
STOCK YIELD 
FARM INCOME 
CAPITAL GAINS 
(FIRST.DRPAC) 
(DNFCL) 
(DRIRLA) 
(DDBTEQ) 
(DPSTKY) 
(DRPPFF) 
(DLAGP) 
1.42 0.51 2.79 
7.92 2.56 3.08 
16.32 4.92 3.31 
663.24 310.79 2.13 
20.50 8.39 2.44 
-0.08 0.03 -2,32 
-0.54 0.28 -1.90 
^Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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return. The value of the other coefficients in demand fall, but all 
are still highly significant. Current price still greatly affects cur­
rent quantity in supply. 
Nearly the same story results when adaptive expectations are 
entered (See Table 5.3). A three-year moving-average of past land 
values was used in this case. This formulation is equivalent to the 
capital gains variables used in many previous models. Estimation 
again was performed by two-stage least squares. Demand is affected in 
the same way as with naive expectations, but to a lesser degree. Capi­
tal gains anticipations are the correct sign and highly significant. 
Again, the slope parameter becomes insignificant and the values of the 
other coefficients fall but not as much. In this case, rented land 
(DLDRTD) loses more of its significance than with naive expectations-
Adaptive expectations are not significant in supply at the 10 percent 
level but do have the expected sign. The rest of the supply schedule 
is not greatly influenced. 
Lastly, rational expectations of future capital gains were en­
tered into the estimation procedure. Initially the Fair-Parke program 
(1984) was used to produce FIML estimates of the paramters in the 
model. This is the desired estimation procedure because it is a full 
information procedure, i.e., it imposes all of the a priori restric­
tions during estimation. Also different expectation horizons could 
easily be introduced and tested using this program. Unfortunately, 
after much work was put into getting this program up and operational on 
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Table 5.3. 2SLS estimation of model with adaptive expectations 
MODEL : DEMAND SSE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
284.652819 
24 
11.860534 
309.696000 
DEP VAR: PRICE/ACRE 
(DRPAC) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 2.7990 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = -0.4050 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
157.18 
0.0001 
0.9813 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
VARIABLE^ ESTIMATE ERROR T RATIO 
QUANTITY OF TRANSFERS (FIRST.DQSAL) -0.15 0.14 -1.07 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ) -737.45 76.81 -9.59 
INTEREST RATE (DFLBR) -7.75 1.63 -4.73 
OFF-FARM INCOME (DRPPFN) 0.08 0.01 4.80 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE (DAVS) 1.08 0.12 8.94 
PERCENT RENTED LAND (DLDRTD) 8.61 4.99 1.72 
U.S. POPULATION (DUSPOP) 4.96 0.87 5.67 
CAPITAL GAINS (WTDLGP) 0.40 0.17 2.27 
MODEL : SUPPLY SSE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
DEP VAR: QUANTITY 
(DQSAL) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = 
VARIABLES 
3405.003 
25 
136.200122 
2633.606 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
5.21 
0.0009 
0.5932 
1.1507 
0.3764 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
STANDARD 
ERROR T RATIO 
PRICE/ACRE (FIRST.DRPAC) 1.24 0.45 2.74 
FORECLOSURES (DNFCL) 8.07 2.80 2.88 
RETURN TO LAND (DRIRLA) 16.34 5.14 3.17 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ) 689.81 325.32 2.12 
STOCK YIELD (DPSTKY) 20.47 8.51 2.40 
FARM INCOME (DRPPFF) -0.08 0.03 -2.20 
CAPITAL GAINS (WTDLGP) -0.37 0.23 -1.57 
^Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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the Iowa State University computer system, it was observed that the 
cost to obtain FIML estimates greatly outweighed the benefits and 
available budget. Some estimates were obtained as the program iterated 
towards the convergence criterion, and these will be used for compari­
son with limited-informat ion estimates. 
Instrumental variables estimation was performed using SAS (1982). 
Land values were regressed on past exogenous variables, with the years 
adjusted to account for how far ahead the expectations were formulated. 
Predicted land prices from these regressions were then used as instru­
ments for the capital gains expectations variable in the full model. 
These estimates are limited-information estimates in the sense that 
during estimation, only part of the a priori information is considered. 
Because expectatons are a function of the exogenous variables that make 
up the model, these estimates serve as a good "second best" approach. 
In fact, it has been argued that limited-information estimates may in 
fact be preferred to full-information estimates. Cumby, Huizinga, and 
Obstfeld (1983) pointed out that full-information estimates, because 
they rely on all available information, will provide inconsistent esti­
mates of all the system's parameters if even one misspecification is 
present in any one equation. Limited-information estimates on the 
other hand, are robust to specification errors not found in the equa­
tion incorrectly defined. 
Instrumental variables estimation was performed for five rational 
expectations models with single capital gains forecasts out to five 
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years in the future. Very little support was found for the validity of 
the REH in the farm real estate market (See Tables 5.4-5.8). 
The first regression included expected next year's land value 
i.e., DRPAC^+2 (PlHAAT). In both equations the variable turned 
out to be statistically insignificant. In the demand equation only 
DLDRTD was left as significant. Signs and magnitudes changed for many 
of the variables. Supply was much less affected but specification was 
definitely not improved. 
Using DRPAC®^2 as the relevant measure of capital gains, 
much the same story unfolded, but with much less impact on the demand 
schedule. Rationally forecasted capital gains were very insignificant 
in demand, leaving the rest of the equation not so drastically altered. 
In supply they had an unexpected sign as well as being insignificant. 
Results get increasingly poor as the expectations horizon is 
lengthened to five years. In each scenario the variable has the unex­
pected sign for both equations. In all cases, they are also insignifi­
cant except in supply for the five-year case. Some implausible signs 
on other variables also keep resulting in each case. 
Simulations were run for each estimation in order to assess the 
predictive power of each. SIMLIN in SAS (1982) was used to perform 
static simulations within-sample. Due to the limited data available, 
simulations for the REH models lost the first observation and some of 
the last observations. This resulted from the regressions of DRPAC^+j 
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Table 5.4 Limited information estimation of REH model with DRPAC^^j 
MODEL : DEMAND SSE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
DEP VAR: PRICE/ACRE 
(DRPACPl) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION 
897.710237 
22 
40.805011 
452.119541 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
39.86 
0.0001 
0.9355 
1.5535 
0.1308 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
VARIABLE® ESTIMATE ERROR T RATIO 
QUANTITY OF TRANSFERS (FIRST.DQSALPl) 0.39 0.68 0.58 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQIT) -222.08 637.68 -0.34 
INTEREST RATE (DFLBRIT) -2.49 8.92 -0.28 
OFF-FARM INCOME (DRPPFNIT) 0.00446 0.09 0.04 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE (DAVSIT) 0.46 0.78 0.58 
PERCENT RENTED LAND (DLDRTDIT) 26.06 7.13 3.65 
U.S. POPULATION (DUSPOP) -0.50 4.43 -0.11 
CAPITAL GAINSt+i (PIHAAT) 0,47 0.54 0.87 
MODEL : SUPPLY SSE 2795.639 F RATIO 3.96 
DFE 23 APPROX PR>F 0. 0056 
DEP VAR: QUANTITY MSE 121.549514 R-SQUARE 0. 5466 
(DQSALPl) OBJ 2158.699 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 1.2926 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = 0.3220 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
VARIABLE* ESTIMATE ERROR T RATIO 
PRICE/ACRE (FIRST.DRPACPl) 0.63 0.31 2.00 
FORECLOSURES (DNFCLIT) 4.62 2.49 1.85 
RETURN TO LAND (DRIRLAIT) 10.69 5.76 1.85 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQIT) 448.63 317.76 1.41 
STOCK YIELD (DPSTKIT) 16.35 8.79 1.86 
FARM INCOME (DRPPFFIT) -0.04 0.04 -1.03 
CAPITAL GAINSt+i (PIHAAT) 0.10 0.23 0.43 
^Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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Table 5.5. Limited—information estimation of REH model with DRPAC®^2 
MODEL : 
DEP VAR: 
DEMAND S SE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
433.131324 
21 
20.625301 
462.014334 
PRICE/ACRE 
(DRPACP2) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 2.0292 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = -0.0933 
VARIABLES 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
78.77 
0.0001 
0.9677 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
STANDARD 
ERROR T RATIO 
QUANTITY OF TRANSFERS (FIRST.DQSALP2) -0 .03 0. 37 -0. 09 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ2T) -691 .17 197. 05 -3. 50 
INTEREST RATE (DFLBR2T) -9 .70 2. 64 -3. 67 
OFF-FARM INCOME (DRPPFN2T) 0 .07 0. 03 1. 90 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE (DAVS2T) 1 .04 0. 21 4. 97 
PERCENT RENTED LAND (DLDRTD2T) 23 .72 7. 06 3. 35 
U.S. POPULATION (DUSP0P2T) 2 .20 1. 87 1. 17 
CAPITAL GAINSt+2 (P2HAAT) 0 .01 0. 11 0. 09 
MODEL : SUPPLY SSE 2920.327 F RATIO 3.75 
DFE 22 APPROX PR>F 0. 0080 
DEP VAR: QUANTITY MSE 132.742114 R-SQUARE 0. 5441 
(DQSALP2) OBJ 2032.84 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 1.2690 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = 0.3364 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
VARIABLES ESTIMATE ERROR T RATIO 
PRICE/ACRE (FIRST.DRPACP2) 0.78 0.36 2.18 
FORECLOSURES (DNFCL2T) 5.07 2.62 1.93 
RETURN TO LAND (DRIRLA2T) 12.15 6.00 2.02 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ2T) 564.36 360.74 1.56 
STOCK YIELD (DPSTK2T) 18.52 9.70 1.90 
FARM INCOME (DRPPFF2T) -0.05 0.04 -1.23 
CAPITAL GAINSt+2 (P2HAAT) 0.11 0.16 0.69 
^Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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Table 5.6. Limited-information estimation of REH model withDRPAC^+g 
MODEL: DEMAND SSE 345.748548 F RATIO 83.90 
DFE 20 APPROX PR>F 0.0001 
DEP VAR; PRICE/ACRE MSE 17.287427 R-SQUARE 0.9711 
(DRPACP3 OBJ 421.880211 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 2.2840 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = -0.2338 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
VARIABLE^ ESTIMATE ERROR T RATIO 
QUANTITY OF TRANSFERS (FIRST.DQSALP3) -0.12 0.27 -0.45 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ3T) -798.11 111.59 -7.15 
INTEREST RATE (DFLBR3T) -10.55 1.76 -5.98 
OFF-FARM INCOME (DRPPFN3T) 0.07 0.02 2.63 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE (DAVS3T) 1.13 0.19 5.83 
PERCENT RENTED LAND (DLDRTD3T) 18.19 4.82 3.77 
U.S. POPULATION (DUSP0P3T) 2.19 1.57 1.39 
CAPITAL GAINST+3 (P3HAAT) -0.10 0.08 -1.25 
MODEL : SUPPLY SSE 2557.224 F RATIO 4.04 
DFE 21 APPROX PR>F 0. 0059 
DEP VAR: QUANTITY MSE 121.772572 R-SQUARE : 0. 5740 
(DQSALP3) OBJ 1987.202 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 1.2910 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = 0.3090 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
VARIABLE* ESTIMATE ERROR T RATIO 
PRICE/ACRE (FIRST.DRPACP3) 0.61 0.39 1.56 
FORECLOSURES (DNFCL3T) 3.75 2.59 1.44 
RETURN TO LAND (DRIRLA3T) 7.19 6.17 1.16 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ3T) 524.87 346.84 1.51 
STOCK YIELD (DPSTK3T) 13.00 9.21 1.41 
FARM INCOME (DRPPFF3T) -0.01 0.04 -0.31 
CAPITAL GAINST+3 (P3HAAT) 0.14 0.14 1.01 
^Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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Table 5.7. Limited-information estimation of REH model with DRPAC®^^ 
MODEL : DEMAND SSE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
229.838535 
19 
12.096765 
306.360985 
DEP VAR: PRICE/ACRE 
(DRPACP4) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 2.6260 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = -0.3232 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
89.54 
0.0001 
0.9742 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
VARIABLE* ESTIMATE ERROR T RATIO 
QUANTITY OF TRANSFERS (FIRST.DQSALP4) -0.19 0.32 -0.59 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ4T) -711.89 87.47 -8.13 
INTEREST RATE (DFLBR4T) -10.37 1.60 -6.47 
OFF-FARM INCOME (DRPPFN4T) 0.07 0.03 1.88 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE (DAVS4T) 0.97 0.14 6.87 
PERCENT RENTED LAND (DLDRTD4T) 16.24 4.30 3.77 
U.S. POPULATION (DUSP0P4T) 1.96 2.03 0.96 
CAPITAL GAINST+4 (P4HAAT) -0.05 0.12 -0.40 
MODEL : SUPPLY SSE 2406.624 F RATIO 3.94 
DFE 20 APPROX PR>F 0. 0073 
DEP VAR: QUANTITY MSE 120.331184 R-SQUARE 0. 5799 
(DQSALP4) OBJ 1966.099 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 1.2432 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = 0.3271 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
VARIABLE* ESTIMATE ERROR T RATIO 
PRICE/ACRE (FIRST.DRPACP4) 0.60 0.39 1.52 
FORECLOSURES (DNFCL4T) 2.59 2.65 0.97 
RETURN TO LAND (DRIRLA4T) 4.09 6.03 0.67 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ4T) 516.77 338.80 1.52 
STOCK YIELD (DPSTK4T) 9.37 8.77 1.06 
FARM INCOME (DRPPFF4T) 0.00560 0.04 0.12 
CAPITAL GAINST+4 (P4HAAT) 0.20 0.16 1.21 
^Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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Table 5.8. Limited-information estimation of REH model with DRPAC®^^ 
MODEL : DEMAND SSE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
DEP VAR: PRICE/ACRE 
(DRPACP5) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = 
VARIABLES 
255.843495 
18 
14.213527 
226.829163 
1.6155 
0.1912 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
53.76 
0.0001 
0.9598 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
STANDARD 
ERROR T RATIO 
QUANTITY OF TRANSFERS (FIRST.DQSALP5) 0.06 0.31 0.21 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ5T) -612.16 129.30 -4.73 
INTEREST RATE (DFLBR5T) -8.33 2.26 -3.68 
OFF-FARM INCOME (DRPPFN5T) 0.03 0.04 0.80 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE (DAVS5T) 0.64 0.24 2.59 
PERCENT RENTED LAND (DLDRTD5T) 9.92 5.77 1.71 
U.S. POPULATION (DUSP0P5T) -0.07 2.26 -0.03 
CAPITAL GAINST+5 (P5HAAT) -0.20 0.14 -1.41 
MODEL : SUPPLY SSE 
DFE 
MSE 
OBJ 
DEP VAR: QUANTITY 
(DQSALP5) 
RESIDUALS 
SECOND STAGE STATISTICS 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC 
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION = 
VARIABLE* 
2151.922 
19 
113.259077 
1750.282 
1.1872 
0.3538 
F RATIO 
APPROX PR>F 
R-SQUARE 
4.39 
0.0047 
0.6179 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
STANDARD 
ERROR T RATIO 
PRICE/ACRE (FIRST.DRPACP5) 0.81 0.43 1.86 
FORECLOSURES (DNFCL5T) 0.74 2.78 0.26 
RETURN TO LAND (DRIRLA5T) 0.84 6.08 0.13 
DEBT/EQUITY (DDBTEQ5T) 615.42 340.30 1.80 
STOCK YIELD (DPSTK5T) 2.87 8.67 0.33 
FARM INCOME (DRPPFF5T) 0.01 0.04 0.28 
CAPITAL GAINST+5 (P5HAAT) 0.47 0.23 1.98 
^Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
73 
on the exogenous variables (X) for t and t+1. For example, regressing 
DRPAC2^Q33 on X2to32 ^lto31 S^ve the instrument for DRPAC®^j. 
^2to32 represents current X's so when using DRPAC®^^ in the REH model, 
the estimation period is actually observations 2 through 32 (1951 
through 1981). Below are the RMSEs and RMS%Es for each simulation 
Table 5.9. Predictive accuracies of each model 
DRPAC DQSAL 
Model BMSE RMS%E RMSE RMS%E 
No capital gains variable 3.978 252.77 7.984 405.65 
Naive expectations 2.715 325.90 8.472 804.33 
Adaptive expectations 3.070 263.62 8.305 656.36 
Rational expectations 
with DRPAC^+Y 5.100 353.4610.012747.25 
with DRPAC®^2 3.890 276.10 8.431 565.92 
with DRPAC®+3 3.756 408,63 8.198 647.55 
with DRPAC®+^ 3.339 381.18 8.073 740.45 
with DRPAC|+5 2.909 362.70 8.100 859.48 
(Table 5.9) and the plots of predicted versus actual DRPAC (Figures 
5.3 through 5.9). 
Remembering that the data are detrended (causing exceptionally 
high RMS%E numbers), we see from Table 5.9 that prices are predicted 
more accurately than quantities. This is not surprising in light of 
two facts. First, the models were expressly designed to predict 
prices, not quantity offered for sale. Second, a good measure of the 
actual quantity of farmland offered for sale is not available. There-
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Figure 5.9. Simulation of price in REH model with DRPAC®^^ 
81 
fore, actual transactions were used as the quantity variable and this 
imposes equilibrium on the model itself. With no real measure of quan­
tity, we do not expect the models to be as accurate for this variable. 
Concerning which statistics of fit may be most appropriate, RMSE 
would at first glance seem likely to be the preference of the two 
given. Because the data used are residuals with means of very close to 
zero, there is a danger when dividing by their values. As RMS%E uses 
actual values as a divisor in its formula and RMSE does not, the latter 
may well be the more appropriate in this case. One can see from Table 
5.9, especially in the DQSAL case, RMS%E is certainly not a monotonie 
transformation of RMSE. On the other hand, very few actual observa­
tions fall very close to zero. Thus, RMS%E should not be too affected. 
Therefore, the choice between the two is not clear cut. It may depend 
on personal preference to look at percentages or not. 
Examining the results for the price simulations first, several 
items are worth noting. The simulation without capital gains included 
fits remarkably well. RMSE is relatively high but RMS%E is next to the 
lowest. The plot (Figure 5.1) appears to track nicely. At least two 
major turning points are missed but it is interesting to note that in 
chose cases the change is predicted one period before it actually oc­
curred. Naive expectations have the best statistics of fit. The plot 
(Figure 5.3) confirms this as all of the turning points beyond 1961 are 
captured. Adaptive expectations appear to lie somewhere between the 
first two results (See Figure 5.4). The REH models unfortunately 
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cannot be compared as easily due to the loss of some of the most cur­
rent data. The statistics of fit appear consistently poorer than the 
other models but they do improve as the expectations horizon is length­
ened. The graphs (Figures 5.5-5.9) track well and the turning points 
are picked up or anticipated shortly before occurring. But due to the 
insignificance of the capital gains variables and the usually-incorrect 
signs, the predictive power most likely stems from the other variables 
in the equations. 
Turning briefly to the quantity simulations, the results are not 
very clear cut. The model without capital gains has the best statis­
tics of fit. The naive expectations model has a little worse than 
average numbers (See Table 5.9). The pictures (Figures 5.2 and 5.10-
5.15) reveal very little difference between the without, naive, and 
adaptive expectations models. Predicted turning points lag one year 
behind actual ones. Naive expectations appears to lessen the largest 
errors, but the numbers do not seem to bear that out. Once again 
comparison of the REH models is complicated by the lost observations. 
Due to the large variability in the lost data, the statistics of fit 
are biased downward for the REH models. The simulation plots track 
reasonably well, but the statistics of fit are not as good as those for 
the other models in general. The residual effects of all the other 
variables may be the only reason the results stay as close as they do. 
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Figure 5,11. Simulation of quantity in model with adaptive expectations 
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Figure 5.12. Simulation of quantity in REH model with DRPAC^^j^ 
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Figure 5,13. Simulation of quantity in REH model with DRPAC^+g 
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Figure 5.14. Simulation of quantity in REH model with DRPAC®^^ 
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Figure 5.15. Simulation of quantity in REH model with DRPAC®^^ 
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Figure 5.16. Simulation of quantity In REH model with DRPAC^^^ 
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The results of the limited—information estimates help to explain 
the "quasi—FIML" results that were obtained from the Fair—Parke 
program (Table 5.10). The results are "quasi-FIML" in the sense that 
they did not fully converge to the specified criterion, and therefore, 
are not the true FIML estimates. The model used in the FIML runs had 
capital gains expectations included for times t+1, t+2, and t+3. 
Standard errors are not available for these coefficients because the 
covariance matrix of the errors in the model was not estimated in order 
to save money. As the computer program iterated the other-than REH 
coefficients changed very little but the DRPAC^^j values kept avoid­
ing convergence. These results reinforce the limited-information 
results.—The exogenous variables, with the exception of the capital 
gains' variables, all fall very close to the results obtained in the 
previous without, naive, and adaptive expectations models. This may 
well be the result of the starting values given for the coefficients. 
But the DRPAC^_|_j coefficients jump apparently at random from 
positive to negative and do not seem to be heading for a limit or con­
vergence. Simulation with these coefficients gave poor results, pos­
sibly due to the implausible sign for DRPAC®_j_j in both equations. 
Unfortunately, the results of these estimations are not easily 
compared to any previous studies. Only the Herdt and Cochrane (1966) 
model is similar in structure. The use of detrended data makes the 
structural parameters unccmparable. Most of the exogenous variables in 
the Herdt and Cochrane model turned out to be insignificant in my esti-
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Table 5.10. "Quasi-FIML" estimation results 
Equation Variable Parameter Estimate 
Demand 
Quantity 
Debt/Equity 
Interest Rate 
Off-Farm Income 
Farm Size 
Rented Land 
Population 
Capital Gainst+i 
Capital GainS(-+2 
Capital Gainst+3 
Supply 
Price/Acre 
Foreclosures 
Return to Land 
Debt/Equity 
Stock Yield 
Farm Income 
Capital Gains^+i 
Capital Gainst+2 
Capital GainSt+3 
(DQSAL) 
(DDBTEQ) 
(DFLBR) 
(DRPPFN) 
(DAVS) 
(DLDRTD) 
(DUSPOP) 
(DRPAC®+i) 
(DRPACC+g) 
(DRPACe+g) 
(DRPAC) 
(DNFCL) 
(DRIRLA) 
(DDBTEQ) 
(DPSTKY) 
(DRPPFF) 
(DRPAC®+J) 
(DRPACt+g) 
(DRPAC®+3) 
-.503 
-872.129 
-10 .616  
.  116  
.979 
17.234 
4.314 
-.597 
.387 
1.090 
.946 
5.269 
12.297 
641.366 
21.050 
-.054 
.678 
-7.097 
-.029 
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mations, and were therefore left out of the final model. The other 
variables were not enough alike to compare using the reduced form 
coefficients. Herdt and Cochrane did not present any elasticities that 
could have been used for comparison. These same problems were also 
encountered when comparison was attempted with other studies. 
CHAPTER VI. PREDICTION AND IMPACT MULTIPLIERS 
Choosing the naive expectations model as the most representative 
of the behavior in the farm real estate market, the last undertaking 
of this study was to make land value predictions. SIMNLIN in SAS 
(1982) was used to perform dynamic simulations. Values for the 
exogenous variables were specified for the time period 1983 through 
1990. When actual or published estimates for the variables were 
available, they were used. Otherwise, a "best guess" was solicited 
from persons in contact with the variable in question, or from histor­
ical patterns in the data. The simulation uses the models' own pre­
dictions for the lagged price variable. 
Exogenous variable values were first specified in undetrended 
form (using real values for the monetary variables). Then, they were 
detrended assuming the same trend equation that was used for the 
original sample data applies. Simulations performed using this data 
gave results for detrended quantity and detrended real price per acre. 
These values were subsequently converted back into undetrended form 
using the original trend equations for quantity (QSAL) and price 
(RPAC). Nominal prices in this case are directly influenced by the 
price level. 
The base simulation was run assuming the farm economy will turn 
around and begin an upswing in late 1985. Real income return to land 
(RIRLA) hits bottom in 1984 at $5.30 per acre. It gradually increases 
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to $11.50 per acre in 1990. This represents an increase back up to 77 
percent of the peak hit in 1973. Real per capita personal income of 
farmers from farm sources (RPPFF) falls to $700 in 1984 but rebounds 
to $1,600 by 1990. This represents an increase to 70 percent of the 
peak reached in 1973. Real per capita income of farmers from nonfarm 
sources (RPPFN) remains fairly stable, its lowest value of $1,829 
occurring in 1983, and its peak of $2,010 (only slightly above the 
historic high) coming at the end of the simulation period. The growth 
in average farm size (AVS) slows slightly during the middle 1980s, but 
by 1990 AVS is 491 acres. The percentage of farmland that is rented 
(LDRTD) remains increasing at its historic trend (.5 percent per 
year). United States population (USPOP) also continues basically 
along its historic trend. The number of farm foreclosure transfers 
(NFCL) actually peaks in 1985 at 6.9, then decreases slowly to 6.1 by 
1990. Farmers debt-to-equity ratio (DBTEQ) rises up through 1986 as 
asset values fall, hitting a peak of .325 and declining slowly there­
after. The Federal Lank Bank interest rate and the yield on preferred 
stocks (FLBR and PSTKY respectively) were assumed to peak at their 
1984 levels with only slight declines after that time. 
The model appears to follow the recent trends in land prices and 
quantities, and the predictions past 1985 seem reasonable given the 
specified levels for the exogenous variables (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
Land values bottom out in 1985 at a real value of $164.66 per acre. 
This represents a decline of 43 percent from the peak real value in 
«PAC 
2?.t + 
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2 1 0  
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Figure 6.1. Predicted real land values from base simulation 
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1979. After only a slight improvement in 1986, land prices rebound to 
$222.03 per acre in 1990. Equilibrium quantity declines slowly up to 
1985, but falls sharply in 1986. As the farm economy rebounds, so do 
transactions, which appear to be slowing as the year 1990 approaches. 
Table 6.1 presents impact multipliers for the predetermined vari­
ables. The short—run columns represent the affect a one-unit increase 
in the predetermined variable would have on the current land value and 
quantity. These columns are simply the reduced form coefficients for 
the models' two endogenous variables. 
The long-run multipliers represent the affect of a one-unit per­
manent increase in the exogenous variable on the long-run equilibrium 
price and quantity of farmland. In the long run, current price equals 
lagged price, thus, a multiplier for that predetermined variable is 
not relevant. The long—run impact multipliers were calculated from 
the reduced form coefficients in the following manner. Given 
reduced-form equations in matrix notation 
Yt = BXt + CYt-i 
where Y{. = endogenous variables at time t, 
Xf- = exogenous variables at time t, and 
B, C = parameter matrices. 
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Table 6.1. Short- and long-run multipliers for predetermined vari­
ables 
Price (RPAC) Quantity (QSAL) 
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Debt/Equity 
(DBTEQ) 
-618.432 -1,003.159 -219.242 -220.911 
Interest Rate 
(FLBR) 
-6.419 -10.413 -9.160 -9.178 
Off—farm Income 
(RPPFN) 
.059 .096 .085 .085 
Farm Size 
(AVS) 
.913 1.482 1.303 1.306 
Rented Land 
(LDRTD) 
9.062 14.699 12.931 12.956 
Population 
(USPOP) 
3.209 5.206 4.580 4.588 
Foreclosures 
(NFCL) 
-.632 -1 .026  7.019 7.018 
Return to Land 
(RIRLA) 
-1.303 -2.114 14.464 14.460 
Stock Yield 
(PSTKY) 
-1.637 -2.656 18.173 18.168 
Farm Income 
(RPPFF) 
.007 . 012  -.079 -.079 
Capital Gains 
(LAGP) 
.384 N/A® .002 N/A^ 
&N/A = not applicable. 
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The long-run effect of a permanent and constant setting of an 
exogenous variable on the endogenous variables is calculated as 
(I - C)-l B. 
These are the long-run impact multipliers that are presented. The 
reader will note the affect that lagged price (capital gains expecta­
tions) has upon the long-run equilibrium price and quantity of farmr-
land as the multipliers are discussed. 
Examining the multipliers for the real value of farmland (RPAC) 
first, we notice that the sign for the debt/equity ratio (DBTEQ) in 
the short-run is negative. In the current period, a one percent in­
crease in the debt/equity ratio causes a $6.18 decrease in the value 
of farmland (the impact multiplier appears large due to the units used 
in the estimation). This agrees with the sign of DDBTEQ in the supply 
and demand equations (where the two effects reinforce each other, that 
is, both depress price). In the long-run, the drop in price causes 
expected capital gains to fall. This causes a further decrease in de­
mand and a further increase in supply (because of the positive and 
negative sign of lagged price in demand and supply, respectively). 
Thus, a larger drop in price occurs in the long run. The fact that 
agents in the market observe the change to be permanent in the long-
run also helps to cause the greater price decline. 
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An increase in the cost of credit (FLBR) causes demand to fall 
and, subsequently prices. This result is a little more pronounced in 
the long run, as the change is deemed permanent, but primarily due to 
the capital gains effect. As prices fall, so do expected capital 
gains. This causes demand to fall and supply to increase. This 
pushes prices down even more. The same conclusion applies (but in the 
opposite direction) when off-farm income (RPPFN), average farm size 
(AVS), percentage of rented land (LDRTD), and population (USPOP) are 
increased. Each causes a growth in demand (and price) in the short-
run. The affect of anticipated capital gains makes demand increase 
and supply decrease, therefore, a stronger rise in price in the long-
run. Foreclosures (NFCL) increase supply and depress price in the 
short-term. In the long-run, prices rise even more, again the result 
of expected capital gains and how they enter the supply and demand 
schedules. 
Prices decrease in the short run as the income return to land 
(RIRLA) grows, this is caused by the positive affect on supply exerted 
by this variable. As the opportunity cost of a land investment 
(PSTKY) grows, less land is purchased and prices fall in the current 
period. The long-run effects are again an even greater drop in 
prices. This is a result of the drop in demand and increase in supply 
due to the lower expected capital gains. 
As farm income from farming (RPPFF) grows, supply falls and 
prices rise in the short run. Again over the longer term, prices in­
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crease even more due to the lagged price affects. In the short run, 
greater expected capital gains (LAGP) increase demand more than they 
decrease supply as prices are pressured upwards. 
Moving to the equilibrium quantity effects, an increase in the 
debt/equity ratio reduces quantity in the short-run. This stems from 
the relatively greater reduction in demand versus the increase in sup­
ply due to the higher leverage position. The long-run influence on 
quantity differs little from the short-run. This is because the addi­
tional shifts in demand and supply have offsetting quantity affects. 
As the cost of credit increases, transfers fall as demand slackens. 
The long-run effect is again only slightly different, which is the 
case for all of the quantity impact multipliers. And to reiterate, 
this result stems from the affect expected capital gains have on sup­
ply and demand. Greater anticipated capital gains strengthen demand 
and lower supply. These two affects work together to raise prices but 
they have an offsetting affect on quantity. As off-farm income, aver­
age farm size, rented land, and population increase, equilibrium farm 
transfers grow in the short-run due to the increased demand. More 
foreclosures increase supply, and thus, equilibrium quantity in the 
short-run. The long-run results are nearly the same, again the result 
of the offsetting quantity influence of capital gains. 
Like foreclosures, the income return to land, stock yields, and 
farm income all affect quantity in just the opposite way that they in­
fluenced price. RIRLA increasing causes quantity to rise in the short-
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run due to the positive coefficient it carries in the supply schedule. 
Greater PSTKY pushes quantity up in the short-run as investors move out 
of farmland. The long-run responses are again very close to the short-
run values. 
Growing RPPFF slows supply and quantity of transfers in the short-
run. The long-run effect is basically identical to the short-run re­
sponse, again for the reasons mentioned above. Lastly, the net effect 
of lagged prices in the short-run is to increase quantity. As ex­
plained previously, this is due to the relatively greater increase in 
demand versus the decrease in supply. 
One final comment must be made about these predictions. The use 
of detrended data adds-Some- complicating factors to the f orecasts. 
Obviously nobody knows what is going to happen in the future. But the 
application of historic trends to future values of the models' vari­
ables implies the belief that those trends will continue. This is not 
an assumption that is actually thought to be correct. It was simply a 
necessary step given the estimation of the model using detrended data. 
With the major decrease in farmland values and subsequent restructuring 
of U.S. agriculture that is currently occurring, it is actually be­
lieved that the trends present in the farmland market and in many of 
the variables influencing it will change. For example, the historic 
trend for quantity is -4.8 units per year. Obviously, this trend can­
not continue forever or there would be negative transfers. This trend 
in quantity, and the $6.50 per year trend on price do show up in the ex 
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ante forecast presented. This should be kept in mind when the move­
ments in price or quantity are analyzed. 
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CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research presented herein had two major goals to accomplish. 
The first goal was to specify a predictive econometric model that could 
simulate the movements of farmland values and at the same time have a 
sound economic base. The second goal was to incorporate and empiri­
cally test the validity of the REH as applied to the farm real estate 
market. 
A simultaneous demand and supply model for agricultural land was 
developed. Expected capital gains measured as anticipated future land 
prices were incorporated into the system using naive, adaptive, and 
rational-expectations-frameworks These three models along with_the _ 
original one were estimated and solved for the period in which data 
existed. All but the REH models were estimated using two-stage least-
squares. The REH models were estimated using an instrumental variables 
procedure that produced limited-information estimates. Only partial 
full-information maximum likelihood estimates of one REH model were 
obtained due to the very high computation costs. These were used as a 
comparison tool for the limited-information estimates. 
Very little evidence was found to support the REH in this in­
stance. The model without a capital gains variable included was the 
starting point of the investigation (See Table 5.1). The demand equa­
tion appears very well specified. The R^ and F-ratio are very high. 
The supply equation has weaker statistics but still performs well. Hie 
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exogenous variables in each equation are all highly significant and all 
but one have the expected signs. The simultaneous determination of 
current prices and quantities proved to be a correct specification. 
The sign of the jointly dependent right-hand side variable in both de­
mand and supply was as expected and significant. This result remained 
for basically all but the REH models. Interestingly, the current re­
turn to farmland was insignificant in demand and produced a positive 
sign in supply. The positive sign in supply might be justified by not­
ing that higher returns are a good selling point and are highly corre­
lated to price. This finding somewhat counters Melichar's (1979) find­
ing that the current return to land could explain much of the land 
value increase. The findings in this study indicate that the demand 
for farmland is not responsive to the current return to farmland. Gov­
ernment payments to farmers also were determined to be insignificant 
factors in land prices. Simulation of the model provided very good re­
sults for price and good results for quantity. The results for price 
were almost too good in that they left very little room for improvement 
once capital gains expectations were added. 
Naive expectations entered the model with correct signs and high 
significance levels. Only small changes occurred in the other vari­
ables except that the significance of current price in demand fell way 
off. This may have occurred because current prices are not as impor­
tant if capital gains are still expected to occur. Simulation with 
this model provided the best results. Prices were tracked very closely 
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and turning points rarely missed. Quantities were fairly well simulat­
ed, especially being as the model was not expected to be as accurate 
for quantities as for prices. 
Adaptive expectations provided nearly the same results as naive 
expectations but their significance was questionable in supply. 
Changes of other variables were similar to the previous case but smal­
ler. Simulations were not quite as good as with naive expectations. 
Rational expectations turned out to be a big disappointment. It would 
seem that this would be a good case for the theory to be correct; ex­
pectations of the dependent variable are very important, well developed 
structural process, well known or easily available data, etc. Limited-
information instrumental variables estimation was used to obtain coef­
ficient estimates of the structural equations. Single-period expecta­
tion horizons were used. In no case did the significance of the price 
anticipation reach the 5 percent level. In the one case where the sig­
nificance approached the five percent level, the sign of the coeffi­
cient was incorrect a priori. Each estimation gave poor results. The 
sign on the price expectation variable changed as the single—period ex­
pectation horizon was changed. The signs, magnitudes, and significance 
levels of the other right-hand side variables were often drastically 
affected in a negative way. The simulations still tracked well despite 
the changes, but not as well as with the other anticipations mecha­
nisms. This fit was most likely due to the predictive power that 
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remained in the variables whose significance levels were left 
relatively unchanged by the REH estimation. 
The limited-information estimates confirmed the results of the 
quasi-full-information maximum likelihood estimates. True FIML results 
had to be stopped short because of the extreme cost. The FIML estima­
tion ran into convergence problems because the signs on the three-
period expectations varied within-equation. The varying signs for 
those variables in the limited-information estimations are consistent 
with that finding. 
The results of the research presented here lead one to conclude 
that the REH is not valid as applied to the farm real estate market. 
Expectations of future land values (capital gains or losses) do appear 
to be a significant factor to people on both sides of the market. 
Naive expectations seem to capture most accurately the true anticipa­
tions used by market participants. 
Due to the apparent inapplicability of the REH in this instance, 
some tests were not run. Analysis of the correct expectations horizon 
used by land buyers or sellers could not be performed. The restric­
tions implied by the REH were not tested as the REH appeared invalid 
anyway. 
Even though the REH seems inappropriate in this model, there are 
several reasons that may account for this finding. Available data 
limited the expectations horizon and the length of lagged exogenous 
variables with which to form instruments. Information was assumed 
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costless. It may well be that there are costs, either explicit or im­
plicit, in obtaining and processing all of the information necessary to 
have "rational expectations." Computer funds limited the number of 
FIML estimations. The structure and specification of the equations was 
assumed and appears to be roughly correct. But there is room to im­
prove their specification, especially the supply relation. Thus, fur­
ther work is suggested to examine the above problems. 
Using the naive expectations model, ex post and ex ante forecasts 
were developed. With actual or "most likely" values used for the exo­
genous variables, dynamic simulations were performed out to the year 
1990. Under the assumed scenario (a rebounding farm economy after late 
1985), land values fall to 57 percent of the peak real value of 1979. 
This figure of $164.66 per acre was hit in 1985. By 1990, predicted 
land prices rise back to 77 percent of their earlier peak. Equilibrium 
quantity drops sharply by 1987, rebounding nicely by 1990. Impact mul­
tipliers were presented and analyzed for both endogenous variables for 
both the short and long runs. 
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APPENDIX: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
The following is a list of the variables that were used in the 
modeling. Some may not be mentioned in the text because they were 
found to be statistically insignificant and/or of the incorrect sign 
during estimation. The variable label is given first, with a 
description and source information following. For a full reference of 
the data sources see the bibliography. 
ACRTD = number of total farm acres rented. Calculated as land in 
farms (LNDFRMS) x percent land rented (LDRTD) and adjusted 
so that ACRTD is in acres. 
AVS 
CPI 
CREDC 
CSKY 
DBTAS 
DBTEQ 
DEF 
FEXD 
= average size of farms in acres. Sources: (50-81) Ag. 
Stats., U.S.D.A., (82) E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
= consumer price index, all items (1967=100). Sources: 
(50-81) E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A., (82) Survey of Cur. Bus., 
U.S.D.C. 
= farmers debt/equity (DBTEQ) x real federal land bank 
interest rate (RFLBR), a measure of outstanding debt or the 
existing credit conditions. 
= yield on a composite of 500 corporate stocks. Standard and 
Poor's index (%), nominal yield. Source: Bus. Stat., 
U.S.D.C. 
= total liabilities/total assets (TLIAB/TASST) or the debt to 
asset ratio. 
= total liabilities/total equity (TLIAB/PRPEQ) or the debt to 
equity rato. 
= current CPI r 1967 CPI, used to deflate monetary variables. 
= proxy for farm expansion demand. Calculated as a weighted 
average of variance from average farm size i.e., 
(AVS-actual size of farm) x percent farms of that actual 
size, summed over farms of size 10, 30, 60, 85, 120, 160, 
200, 240, and 380 acres when AVS-actual size > 0. Source for 
percentages: Census of Ag., U.S.D.C. 
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FLBR = Federal Land Bank average interest rate on new loans, 
nominal percentage. Sources: (50-79) Econ. Indicators. 
(80-82) Surv. of Cur. Bus., U.S.D.C. 
FNF = Farm as a percentage of nonfarm per capita disposable 
income from all sources. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
FRMACH = value of motor vehicles and other machines on farms 
excluding farm households, current million $. Source: 
E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
GPAY = total government payments to agriculture, current million 
$. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2—2, U.S.D.A. 
IRL = total income return to all agricultural land. Calculated 
as : land value (LDVAL) t total asset value (TASST) = 
percent of assets that are land x 1000 (PRA). (PRA x 1000) 
= LDP. LDP X residual income to farm assets including 
interest on loans in current billion $ (RSAS) = total 
income return to land 
TRLA = IRL r number—of acres of land in farms gives income return 
to land per acre. 
LDRTD = percent of farmland that is rented. Source: Census of 
Ag., U.S.D.C. 
LDVAL = Farm real estate value, farmland only in nominal million $. 
Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2—2, U.S.D.A. 
LNDFRMS = land in farms (1000 acres). Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, 
U.S.D.A. 
NFCL 
NFRM 
NTRT 
number of foreclosure transfers of farm real estate 
(lOOO's). Source: F.R.E.M.D.: Out. and Sit., U.S.D.A. 
number of farms, all farms (lOOO's). Sources: (50-59) Ag. 
Stats., U.S.D.A., (60-82) E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
net rent to all landlords, million nominal $. Source: 
E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
OBS = observation number 1=1950, 33=1982. 
OLDA percent of the farm population age 65 and over, both sexes. 
Source: Farm Pop. of the U.S., U.S.D.A. 
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PAC = price per acre of farmland, current $. Calculated as land 
value (LDVAL) -r land in farms (LNDFRMS) and adjusted to per 
acre values. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
PPFF = per capita personal income of the farm population from farm 
sources, nominal $. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
PPFN = per capita personal income of the farm population from 
non-farm sources, nominal $. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, 
U.S.D.A. 
PRC = crop production index U.S. all crops, 1977=100. Source: 
E.C.I.F.S. 2-5, U.S.D.A. 
PRO = farm production index U.S. all products, 1977=100. Source: 
E.C.I.F.S. 2-5, U.S.D.A. 
PRP = ratio of index prices received to prices paid by farmers 
including interest, taxes, and wages. 1977=100. Sources: 
(50-81) Ag. Stats., U.S.D.A., (82) Ag. Prices, U.S.D.A. 
PRPEQ = Farmers-proprietors equity excluding farm householdsY 
nominal billion $. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A 
PSTKY = yield on preferred stocks, high grade from 10 corporations. 
Standard and Poor's index (%), nominal yield. Source: 
Bus. Stats., U.S.D.C. 
QSAL = number of voluntary and estate settlement farm real estate 
transfers (lOOO's). Source: F.R.E.M.D. Out. and Sit., 
U.S.D.A. 
RED = farm real estate debt, average interest rate on loans 
outstanding, U.S. Source: Ag. Stats., U.S.D.A. 
REDBT = farm real estate debt outstanding, million nominal $ 
excluding farm households. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2—2, 
U.S.D.A. 
RNTACR = NTRT f ACRID adjusted to give net rent per acre. 
RSAS = residual income to farm assets including interest on loans, 
nominal billion $. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
TASST = total farm assets excluding farm households, nominal 
billion $. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
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TBLRT 
TLIAB 
UNR 
USPOP 
YEAR 
yield on U.S. Government securities (taxable), 3-month 
bills (rate on new issue-percent, nominal). Source: 
Survey of Cur. Bus., U.S.B.C. 
farm total liabilities excluding farm households, nominal 
billion $. Source: E.C.I.F.S. 2-2, U.S.D.A. 
unemployment rate, all civilian workers including Armed 
Forces, % of the labor force. Sources: (50-79) Econ. 
Indie. (80-82) Survey of Cur. Bus., U.S.B.C. 
U.S. resident population including Armed Forces, millions. 
Source: Cur. Pop. Reports, U.S.B.C. 
= current year 1950-1982. 
To remove the effects of changes in the price level, relevant 
monetary variables were deflated by multiplying them by the variable 
BEF. What follows is a listing of the relevant variables and in 
parentheses the label for the corresponding real variable. 
FRMACH (RFRMACH), GPAY (RGPAY), IRLA (RIRLA), PAC (RPAC), PPFF 
(RPPFF), PPFN (RPPFN), REB (RREB), REBBT (RREBBT), RNTACR (RRNTACR), 
Interest rates and stock yields were deflated by the inflation 
rate. In addition some new variables were created using the real 
values of the existing data set: 
RFLP = RFLBR X RPAC (total credit cost of land). 
RFLIN = RFLP t RPPFF (credit demand on farm income) . 
= RFLP RIRLA (credit cost to return to land ratio). 
= one-year lagged real price of farmland. 
= RIRLA f RPAC (real rate of income return to land). 
RFLRS 
RLAGP 
RROR 
WTRLGP = weighted average of past three years farmland price 
i.e., WTRLGP = .5 RLAGP + .33 RLAG2P + .17 RLAG3P 
RGPYPF = RGPAY f NFRM (real government payments per farm). 
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Lastly the iiiiportant variables were detrended by regressing them 
on YEAR and using the residual values as the new data series. Detrend-
ing was used for a couple of reasons. First of all, many of the vari­
ables were highly influenced by trends. So to get away from possible 
spurious correlation (to see what is really driving the land market) the 
data were detrended. Secondly, after checking the correlation coefficients 
on the raw and real data series, it was determined that a high degree of 
collinearity existed between many of the variables. Detrending helped 
reduce these collinearity problems and thus makes the parameter estimates 
more consistent across model specifications. Below is a listing of the 
variable label and in parentheses the corresponding detrended variable 
label. 
AVS (DAVS), CREDC (DCREDC), DBTAS (DDBTAS), DBTEQ (DDBTEQ), FRMACH 
(DETFRMC), LNDFKMS (DETLND), FEXD (DFEXD), FNF (DFNF), RLAGP 
(DLAGP), LDRTD (DLDRTD), NFCL (DNFCL), NFRM (DNFRM), OLDA (DOLDA), 
PRC (DPRC), PRO (DPRO), PRP (DPRP), QSAL (DQSAL), CSKY 
(DCSKY), FLBR (DFLBR), RFLIN (DRFLIN), RFLP (DRFLP), RFLRS 
(DRFLRS), RGPAY (DRGPAY), RIRLA (DRIRLA), RPAC (DRPAC), RPPFF 
(DRPPFF), RPPFN (DRPPFN), PSTKY (DPSTKY), RRED (DRRED), RREDBT 
(DRREDBT), RRNTACR (DRRNTACR), RROR (DRROR), TBLRT (DTBLRT), UNR 
(DUNR), USPOP (DUSPOP). 
WTDLGP = .5 (DLAGP) + ,33 (DLAG2P) + .17 (DLAG3P). 
DRGPPF = detrended real government payments per farm, i.e. , detrend­
ed RGPYPF. 
A few regressions were run and presented that include variables 
labeled a little differently than above. In general the labels will be 
self explanatory. For example, in the REH estimations 4T or P4 added 
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on the end of the variable simply means that DRPAC®+^ is included 
in that regression and the respective variables have had the number of 
their data points adjusted accordingly. P4HAAT is the instrumental 
variable used to represent DRPAC®^.^. PRE4SH is predicted price out of 
the REH model simulation with P4HAAT included. 
